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I. INTRODUCTION
The extra-territorial' application of the U.S. antitrust laws2 to foreign parties
during a period of increasing international trade has resulted in an escalation of legal
confrontations between the U.S. and foreign nations.3 The furor surrounding recent
attempts to apply U.S. antitrust laws extra-territorially in In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation (Westinghouse),4 International Association of Machinists v. The Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),5 and Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena
Belgian World Airlines (Laker)6 and the recent reintroduction of clawback legislation
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of David A. Cohen.
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1. We must define the manner in which we use the term "extra-territorial." Jurisdiction to prescribe, see infra note
10, can be based on a notion of territoriality, i.e., the locus of the regulated conduct or harm. A nation as a matter of
sovereignty has the right to control and regulate activities within its boundaries. This includes the right to regulate conduct
occurring outside its territory that causes harmful results within its territory. The traditional example of this principle is
transnational homicide, when a malefactor in StateA shoots a victim across the border in State B: State B can proscribe the
harmful conduct.
Alternatively, jurisdiction to prescribe can be based on nationality (the citizenship of an individual or nationality of
a corporation). A state has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing the conduct of its nationals whether the conduct takes
place inside or outside the territory of the state. We deal only with the application of U.S. antitrust laws when territoriality
is the basis for asserting jurisdiction.
Many have objected to the use of the term "extra-territorial," arguing that this is a pejorative appellation used by
foreign countries who object to the rather straightforward application by American courts of the "territorial" principle of
jurisdiction. Other labels such as "conflicts of jurisdiction" have been proposed. See BUREAU OF PUBIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DFP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY BULL. No. 481, ExTRATERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION 1 (1983).
While these critiques are to some extent well taken, the term "extra-territoriality" has come to be identified with the issue
we address here, and we will therefore continue to use it as a matter of convenience.
2. The issues relating to the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws also inhere in other areas of "public
law." This includes federal securities law, criminal law, and other areas of foreign trade law including the Trading with
the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §1 (1982), the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), and the
Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Nevertheless, we believe the antitrust
laws are sufficiently unique to merit individual treatment.
3. International conflicts arise in three overlapping settings:
one, the application of U.S. competition law generally to competition from state-controlled or state-
subsidized enterprises; two, its application to seemingly private cartel arrangements conducted in connec-
tion with the natural resources or other economic development policies or industries fundamental to our
trading partners; and three, the intrusion of U.S. jurisdiction into foreign territory by the demand for the
production of confidential data located abroad.
The Comm 'n on the International Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws Act: Hearings on S. 432 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 432].
4. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Il. 1979), affid, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
5. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
6. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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in the Canadian 7 and Australian8 parliaments are prime examples. Treble damage
suits initiated by private plaintiffs asserting claims under U.S. competition law ex-
acerbate the problem; unlike the government, individuals are not required to evaluate
the impacts on foreign policy of a lawsuit.
U.S. courts have adopted limiting doctrines9 designed to avoid the assertion of
prescriptive jurisdiction ° in the most sensitive private cases, seeking to reduce the
likelihood of divisive confrontation. The executive branch of the U.S. government
has responded by participating in international attempts to articulate universal norms
of economic regulation. The executive branch has also negotiated several bilateral
understandings with trading partners, providing for notification and consultation."
These limited responses have failed to resolve U.S. conflicts with other nations.
Confrontations now occur with even greater frequency and intensity in a variety of
procedural and legal contexts. 12 The underlying problem seems impervious to resolu-
tion.
The intractability of the problem is rooted in the basic nature of extra-territorial
antitrust litigation. The following characteristics of U.S. antitrust litigation have a
particular impact upon foreign defendants and nations:
(1) Suits are time-consuming and extraordinarily complex.
(2) U.S. antitrust procedures differ from the procedural rules followed in most
foreign countries in several significant dimensions. First, private plaintiffs in U.S.
antitrust actions may recover treble damages. This has been particularly offensive to
foreign nations, as evidenced by retaliatory clawback and blocking legislation.' 3
7. Canadian Government Sponsors Bill to Address Extraterritoriality Issue, 46 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. RE'.
(BNA) No. 1168, at 1106-07 (June 7, 1984).
8. The Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, [1984] AusTL. TRADE PRAC. REP. (CCH AusTt.
LTD.) 30-233. See generally Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Legislation:
A View from "Down Under," 16 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 860-61 (1983).
9. See infra part IV.
10. There are four aspects of jurisdictional competence. "Jurisdiction to prescribe" involves limits imposed by
national and international law on a state's ability to exercise its power over specific types of activities. Closely related
thereto is "discovery" jurisdiction, which involves a state's ability to obtain documents and other information. To be
effective, a court or administrative agency with jurisdiction over a case must have the power to order parties to produce
documents and other evidence relevant to the case. The other two aspects of jurisdiction are "adjudicatory" jurisdiction,
which involves the circumstances under which particular individuals or entities may be subject to a state's power, and
"enforcement" jurisdiction, which involves a state's right to enforce the orders of its courts and administrative agencies.
The primary focus of this Article is on the first two aspects of jurisdiction, often viewed as a single aspect of jurisdiction.
11. See infra part V.
12. As demonstrated by the cases discussed infra, conflicts arise in the context of challenges to subject matter
jurisdiction; discovery; service or venue disputes; antisuit injunctions; and attempts to enforce antitrust judgments.
13. Blocking legislation prohibits any discovery within the enacting country pertaining to foreign antitrust litigation,
e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, Austl. Acts No. 121 (1976), as amended, Austl. Acts
No. 202 (1976), replaced by The Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, [1984] AusTL. TRADE PRAC.
REP. (CCH AusTm. LTD.) 30-233. Blocking legislation may also prohibit the enforcement of a foreign antitrust
judgment within the enacting state, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, Austl. Acts No.
13 (1979). Clawback legislation provides for recoupment of damages awarded in an antitrust action against assets of a
plaintiff found within the enacting state. A partial clawback statute allows for recoupment of two-thirds of the damage
award, which represents the punitive element of the trebled recovery. E.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.
11 (United Kingdom). A total clawback statute would allow recoupment of the entire damage award. Countries that have
enacted blocking or clawback statutes include the United Kingdom and Canada.
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Second, successful U.S. defendants are rarely entitled to costs,' 4 while winning
plaintiffs may recover extremely high attorney's fees from defendants. Third, the
U.S. is very liberal in allowing compulsory discovery of evidence.
(3) Extremely large sums are likely to be at issue.
(4) Parties raising antitrust issues may behave strategically because of com-
mercial interests not directly related to the lawsuit. For example, an antitrust litiga-
tion strategy may be designed to strengthen the litigant's position in an exogenous
negotiation.
15
In addition, the following dimensions of international legal relations complicate
an effective resolution of the problem:
(5) Direct conflicts are likely between the relevant public policies of the forum
and the affected and chartering nations, 16 particularly regarding competition law.
(6) Discovery and enforcement procedures involve sensitive relations between
nation-states and are not likely to be governed by clearcut international law.
The solution to the problem inherent in extra-territorial application of national
competition laws requires the promulgation and enforcement of an international com-
petition law code by an authoritative international body. Achieving this goal in the
foreseeable future is unlikely. The few attempts in this direction have, to date, been
halfhearted and in the most part unsuccessful. This Article, therefore, proposes an
interim solution to be taken by the U.S. We advocate a narrow interpretation of all the
doctrines limiting extra-territorial applications in order to generate friction conducive
to reaching a multilateral solution. Significant foreign relations interests of the U.S.
would be protected in the interim by a statutorily mandated process in which the
executive branch could invoke a presumption against the assertion of jurisdiction in
appropriate cases. Our proposal is based upon the following sequence of analysis:
Part II briefly summarizes the U.S. position on the extra-territorial application of its
competition laws. Part III proposes international legal system objectives that should
guide the extra-territorial application of national competition law. Part IV evaluates
the sovereignty-related defenses developed by the U.S. courts, to determine whether
they satisfy the objectives identified in part III, and similarly evaluates the evolving
principles of the jurisdictional rule of reason. Part V then considers the political
solutions proposed or undertaken to date. Finally, in part VI we propose our interim
statutory solution.
14. A successful defendant can recover attorneys fees under the Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4016(b)(4) (1982) and the recently enacted National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, § 5. See 47 ANTrrnusr &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1183, at 588 (Sept. 27, 1984).
15. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1463 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("[Tlhis lawsuit-
essentially a group of separate tort actions which were deemed unsuccessful in Honduran courts-has been repackaged as
an antitrust case in an attempt to subvert prudent and traditional limits upon applications of our laws to foreign conduct and
actors."). A more detailed discussion of that case is found infra text accompanying notes 111-22.
16. Throughout this Article, the country seeking to assert jurisdiction will be referred to as theforum or regulating
nation. Nations whose policies are called into question by the assertion of the forum's jurisdiction will be referred to as the
affected nations. In many instances, the affected or forum nation will also be the country in which the defendant
corporation (or subsidiary) is chartered and where it does a majority of its business. In these instances the forum nation
will also be the chartering nation.
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II. THE U.S. POSITION ON EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY
The U.S. antitrust laws expressly provide for their application to "trade or
commerce with foreign nations." 17 When this clause first came before the Supreme
Court in 1909 in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,18 it was construed as not
covering conduct occurring outside the U.S. With the U.S. emerging as the dominant
world power after World War II, the doctrine of strict territoriality was abandoned
and the prevailing standard for the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws
emerged. This test is set out in the 1945 decision, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa). 19 In Alcoa Judge Learned Hand wrote that the Sherman Act applied
to extra-territorial activities if they were "intended to affect imports or exports,
[and] . .. [are] shown actually to have had some effect on them."2 The prevailing
interpretation of this "effects test" is that the impact of foreign conduct on U.S.
commerce must be direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable. 2'
Foreign governments protest that the extra-territorial application of U.S. anti-
trust laws under the "effects test" is contrary to international law and constitutes an
17. E.g., §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (1982), refer to "trade or commerce ... with foreign
nations." Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982), also applies to "com-
merce ... with foreign nations." Id. § 44. The Clayton Act (and the Robinson-Patman Act, which is technically an
amendment to the Clayton Act) similarly applies to commerce with foreign nations. See 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982); see also
the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1982).
18. 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909).
19. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In Alcoa, French, Swiss, and British aluminum producers formed a cartel
operating Alliance, a Swiss corporation. Alcoa's Canadian subsidiary participated in the cartel, which allocated produc-
tion and controlled the price of aluminum. Judge Hand asserted, "It is settled law ... that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." Id. at 443.
20. Id. at 444.
21. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrrUsT LAws § 2.20, at 73-74 (2d ed. 1973); Blechman,
Antitrust Jurisdiction, Discovery and Enforcement in the International Sphere: An Appraisal of American Development
and Foreign Reactions, 49 ANTrrRuST L.J. 1197, 1198-99 (1980). The scope of extra-territoriality as articulated in Alcoa
is unclear. While Alcoa appears to have articulated an "intended effects" standard, a number of lower courts have
discarded the requirement that the effects shown must have been either intended or foreseeable. See, e.g., Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221,226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (intent to cause direct and material adverse
effect on interstate or foreign commerce presumed as a natural consequence of actions taken); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co.
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587, modifying 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (that the challenged
conduct "directly affected the flow of commerce out of this country"). There has not been a consistent articulation of the
threshold of "effects" required to invest U.S. courts with subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the test has been alternatively
described as "not both insubstantial and indirect," see, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (quoting with approval J. VON KAuNOWS-
KI, ANTrrmusT AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 5.01-5.502 (1969)); or "direct and substantial," see, e.g., cases listed in
Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. & Co.m. L.
REv. 199, 206 (1977). "Direct, substantial and foreseeable" is essentially the standard urged by the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, in its ANTrrRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7 (rev. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
D.O.J. GUIDE]. It is also the standard that Congress used in elaborating upon the scope of the extra-territorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws to export transactions in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)
(1982) ("direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable"). Acceptance of this standard is not universal, however. A court
recently held that "it is probably unnecessary for that effect to be both substantial and direct, so long as it is not de
minimis." Timberane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1464 (N.D. Cal. 1983). One recent gloss has been
placed on this standard. In Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit,
relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), held
that the effects must be anticompetitive effects on United States commerce.
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invasion of their sovereignty.2 2 They contend that an "effects test" is inappropriate
because it should be applied only to conduct universally deemed to be criminal, and
that no such consensus exists as to the antitrust laws of the U.S. To the contrary,
those laws are seen as merely a facet of American economic policy. 23 Yet the U.S. is
apparently not alone in attributing extra-territoriality to its economic regulatory laws.
The trade practice laws of several European nations2 4 and the European Economic
Community 5 by their terms can be, and in some cases have been, applied extra-
territorially.
The Westinghouse litigation26 provides a classic example of the conflicts result-
ing from the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Westinghouse, in the
midst of a contract litigation with a number of public utilities 2 7 learned that its
22. Since 1945 at least 20 foreign governments have protested American assertions of jurisdiction in international
antitrust cases. See. e.g., FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(French Government protests against FTC service of investigatory subpoenas by registered mail). See generally Willough-
by, Remarks by an English Solicitor, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND
OnER LAws 56 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
23. See, e.g., Comment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980: Britain's Response to U.S. Ex-
traterritorial Antitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. OF INT'L L. & B. 476, 477-78 nn.10-12 (1980).
24. For example, art. 98(2) of West Germany's competition statute provides that "[t]his Law applies to all restraints
of competition which have effect within the territory to which this Law applies." Act Against Restraints of Competition
(Gesets gegen Vettbewerbsbeschrankungen) July 27, 1957, [19571 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 1 1080 (W. Germany), as
republished April 4, 1974 [1974] BGBI 1869, amended, Law of June 28, 1976, [19761 BGBI I 917. The Australian
Cartels Act expressly applies to "cartels concluded abroad but affecting the domestic market" and to "cartels relating to
foreign markets." The Australian Trade Practice Act of 1974, Austl. Acts P. 397 (Supp. 1974), as amended Act 1975,
No. 63; Act 1976, No. 88; Act 1977, No. 81; Act 1977, No. 151; Act 1978, No. 206. The Swiss Cartel law has been held
to apply to "restrictions on competition effected abroad and having their effects in Switzerland." Bundesgericht, 21
March 1967; 93 BGE 11 192.
25. In Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972), the Court of Justice of the
European Communities held its antitrust law applicable to conduct occurring outside of the community. It reached this
result by partially piercing the corporate veil, and it cautioned that "jurisdiction is not based merely on the effects of
actions committed outside the Community, but on activities attributable to the claimant within the Common Market area."
Id. at 640. Earlier, the court asserted that "the Community cannot be denied the right, on the basis of public international
law, of taking the necessary steps to safeguard its measures against conduct distorting competition, which has come to
light within the Common Market, even if those responsible for the said conduct reside in a non-member country." Id. at
638. The Commission (the enforcing body) has consistently advocated an extra-territorial reach for the Common Market
antitrust law, In re Omega Watches, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D49 (1970). More recently, the EEC has proceeded with its case
against International Business Machines (IBM) despite repeated expressions of concern by the U.S. government. See
generally EEC Commission Will Continue with Antitrust Case Against IBM, 42 ANTITRuST & TRADE REO. REP. (BNA)
1030-33 (1982); Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1984, at 34, col. 1. This case has been settled. See id., Aug. 3, 1984, at 2,
col. 3.
26. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. III. 1979). aff'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); see
Comment, supra note 23, at 483-91. For a detailed review of the facts see Note, The Effects Tests vs. Act of State
Considerations: A Comparison of the OPEC and Westinghouse Decisions, 53 COLO. L. REv. 677 (1982).
27. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse), a major supplier of
nuclear power plants for public utilities, entered into a number of contracts to construct nuclear facilities. The contracts
also provided that Westinghouse would supply the facilities with uranium fuel for a fixed term at a set price, subject to an
escalator clause pegged to the general rate of inflation. Westinghouse's commitment to supply uranium ultimately reached
in excess of 70 million pounds. Westinghouse was not a significant producer of uranium at the time it entered into these
arrangements and did not cover itself with future contracts to guarantee its ability to deliver the uranium. The going price
for uranium was $6 to $8 per pound during the time the contracts were made. By 1975 the price of uranium had risen much
faster than the rate of inflation, up to $26 per pound, and by 1978 the price reached $44 per pound. In 1975, facing at that
time a multibillion dollar loss if it continued to supply the promised uranium at contract price, Westinghouse notified the
utilities that it would not honor the contracts because of commercial impracticability. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). In
response to the repudiation the electric utilities sued Westinghouse, alleging breach of contract. The federal cases were
consolidated into one action in the Eastern District of Virginia. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.,
405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974). The sums in controversy were staggering. The potential consequences of the
litigation were equally sobering. A court order to perform could have rendered Westinghouse insolvent; if Westinghouse
were excused from performance the utilities would have to suffer an unexpected and significant increase in costs.
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inability to perform its contractual obligations was caused by the operation of a cartel
formed by the major uranium producers. Westinghouse filed suit in United States
district court, alleging a violation of the U.S. antitrust laws by twenty-nine de-
fendants, including foreign producers from Australia, England, South Africa, and
Canada.2
8
Westinghouse embarked upon a discovery effort, obtaining letters rogatory
2 9
from the American courts. The U.S. Department of Justice also initiated its own
grand jury proceeding. Australia, South Africa, and Canada adopted measures pro-
hibiting compliance with the discovery requests.3 ° In England, Westinghouse sought
enforcement from the House of Lords. The House of Lords refused to enforce the
letters rogatory, deferring to the British government's view that British sovereignty
would otherwise be infringed.31
The foreign defendants also refused to appear in the private antitrust action and
default judgments were entered against them.32 The four affected nations filed amicus
briefs arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 33 The countries also requested the
support of the U.S. Attorney General. The Attorney General did not submit an
amicus curiae brief supporting the position of the four affected nations. 34 The
28. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affid, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). The
foreign defendants included Conzine Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd., Pancontinental Mining
Ltd., and Queensland Mines Ltd. (Australian); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. Ltd., and RTZ Services Ltd. (British); Nuclear Fuels
Corp. of South Africa Ltd., and Anglo American Corp. of South Africa Ltd. (South African); and Rio Algom Ltd.
(Canadian). The cartel was allegedly formed in response to the passage of U.S. legislation barring the importation of
uranium. See Note, supra note 26, at 678. This legislation closed off three-quarters of the world market to foreign
producers. To avoid ruin, the foreign producers allegedly met to divide up the rest of the market. Westinghouse sought S6
billion in damages for the losses incurred as a result of the activities of the cartel.
29. A "letter rogatory" is "[a] request by one court of another court in an independent jurisdiction, that a witness be
examined upon interrogatories sent with the request." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979). Wright & Miller
define the term as follows:
Letters rogatory are formal communications in writing sent by a court in which an action is pending to a court or
judge of a foreign country requesting that the testimony of a witness resident within the jurisdiction of the latter
court may be there formally taken under its direction and transmitted to the first court for use in the pending
action.
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2083 (1970).
30. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3 (Ont. 1977); The Foreign Pro-
ceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, supra note 13.
31. The English courts initially gave effect to the letters rogatory pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1970,23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, to
which both England and the U.S. are signatories. The Convention was executed in the United Kingdom by the Evidence
(Proceeding in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, ch. 34. The foreign parties and corporations named in the letters refused to
testify, claiming privilege under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and comparable EEC and British safe-
guards. The Department of Justice, seeking the same information for the grand jury, assured the presiding U.S. district
judge that since the evidence requested by the letters rogatory might be indispensable to the grand jury investigation, the
witnesses' testimony would be immunized for use in any criminal prosecution in the U.S. Westinghouse then sought an
order to compel discovery in England, and the issue came before the House of Lords. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977). The House of Lords held that it was not obligated to comply under
the Hague Convention because Department of Justice intervention had converted the case into a criminal proceeding.
32. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. II1. 1979), affd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
33. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980).
34. Instead, Associate Attorney General Shenefield wrote a short letter to District Court Judge Marshall, stating in
part that "[tihe views and representations advanced by these foreign governments are entitled to appropriate deference and
weight in resolving legal questions that turn, at least in part, on considerations of international comity." Letter from John
Shenefield to Judge Prentice H. Marshall (May 6, 1980).
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amicus briefs filed by the affected nations had a negative effect on the appellate
court 3 5
The case ultimately was settled by the parties,3 6 and the Department of Justice
terminated its investigation without taking any action. Unfortunately, the litigation
had lasting repercussions; the most serious has been the enactment by all four affected
nations of blocking and other protective legislation.37
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM OBJECTIVES THAT SHOULD GUIDE
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW
The formulation of proper boundaries for the extra-territorial application of U.S.
antitrust law must begin with a consideration on a world level of the implications of
extra-territoriality. Purely national approaches to these issues will exacerbate tensions
between nations and produce a poor environment for international trade. An ideal
resolution of the problem must effectively: (1) insure against gaps in the international
order so that firms cannot position themselves in "havens" and avoid the application
of reasonable national competition law; (2) provide an equitable and efficient climate
for the transaction of international business; (3) consider and balance the political and
economic interests of both forum and affected nations; and (4) balance or integrate
the differences in procedural and substantive law among the forum and affected
nations.
A. Avoidance of Havens
Stringent limits on extra-territorial application of competition laws are likely to
produce gaps in which no nation's laws are applicable. For example, assume that
marketing agreements violating the competition laws of many nations are made by a
number of multinational firms on a ship of a developing country with no competition
law. A very limited definition of extra-territorial application would place the agree-
ment beyond the reach of any single sovereign state. Multinationals could seek refuge
by positioning anticompetitive transactions in nations whose trade regulation laws do
not condemn the anticompetitive conduct. Substantial components of international
trade could fall outside the regulatory authority of responsible governments. Such a
phenomenon could produce significant inefficiencies in world trade and could have
negative impacts in many world economies. 38
35. The court wrote:
In the present case, the defaulters have contumaciously refused to come into court and present evidence as to
why the District Court should not exercise its jurisdiction. They have chosen instead to present their entire case
through surrogates .... And shockingly to us, the governments of the defaulters have subserviently presented
for them their case against the exercise of jurisdiction.
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980).
36, See Note, supra note 26, at 677 n.6.
37. See supra note 7 (Canada); supra notes 8, 13 (Australia); The Atomic Energy Act of 1978, 15 Stat. Repub. S.
Ar. 1061 (1978) (South Africa); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II (United Kingdom).
38. Cartel behavior resulting in boycotts and price-fixing may cause deadweight loss in domestic economies and
may also distort trade exchanges. The Arab boycott of Jewish-owned firms (and/or firms doing business with the State of
Israel) and the uranium cartel at issue in Westinghouse provide ready examples.
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Conversely, if each nation asserts far-reaching extra-territorial application of its
competition laws, the result may be a tumultuous environment for world trade. Firms
will expend much time and effort trying to comply with conflicting rules. The con-
flicting rules in turn represent an uncoordinated and inefficient regulatory scheme.
Ideally, each nation's extra-territorial reach should physically complement that of
other nations. Unfortunately, such a visionary arrangement is not politically feasible
in today's world.39 Also, pragmatic roadblocks prevent nations from acting in-
dependently of an effective international authority to produce a synergistic scheme of
regulation.
40
Consider the lessons from the Westinghouse litigation. 4' The majority of de-
fendants were chartered within the U.S. Some of the American firms had foreign
subsidiaries that participated in the cartel.42 It was alleged that meetings of the cartel
were held throughout the world, including the U.S. (Illinois). One of the twenty-nine
defendants was Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd. (C.R.A.), identified by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as an Australian corporation.43 Yet C.R.A. had
American cousins. R.T.Z. (British) was majority owner of C.R.A.; R.T.Z. also
owned Rio Algom Limited (Canadian), which owned Atlas Alloys, Inc. (American),
which owned Rio Algom Corporation (American). All but Atlas Alloys were de-
fendants in the litigation and Rio Algom entered an appearance in the suit.' Many
nations had an interest in the transaction. It appears impossible to compartmentalize
the cartel arrangement as it existed among the interested nations in the consortium,
for the relationships involved were truly international.
The extra-territorial application of a single nation's laws to such international
cartel arrangements yields only a second-best result. Yet for the present time, extra-
territorialism is preferable to the exemption from national competition laws of
international transactions with deleterious economic effects identical to those of
domestic transactions subject to the law.
B. Positive Climate for International Trade
The fear of extra-territorial application of conflicting national competition laws
inevitably leads to inefficient business planning. Multinationals adopt compliance
procedures to ensure, to the extent reasonably possible, that proposed courses of
action do not violate the law of the host country. These compliance procedures will
break down in the face of differing and conflicting national rules and regulations.
39. The well-documented disparate North-South, haves vs. have-nots viewpoints operated to defeat attempts to work
out truly international agreements on the use of seabed resources and intellectual property. See, e.g.. L. HENKIN, How
NATtONs BEHAVE 220-22 (2d ed. 1979).
40. Nations voluntarily yielding their sovereign authority over international transactions affecting their economy
may be victimized by free-riders. Bilateral or multilateral agreements cannot effectively reach activities originating
outside the territories of the participants without encountering the extra-territoriality conundrum.
41. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
42. See, e.g., id. at 1252 n.5 (Gulf Oil Corporation, U.S., and its wholly owned subsidiary Gulf Minerals Canada
Ltd.).
43. Id. at 1253 n.ll.
44. See supra note 28.
[Volume 45:883
---- ~~asg hJ.b4b..da. - - -
1984] ANTITRUST EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY 891
Even when compliance procedures can be employed, they may greatly reduce the
efficiency of the complying firm. For example, a strategy of compliance may result in
a series of separately negotiated, relatively small trade agreements rather than larger,
more efficient multiparty agreements. Restrictions imposed by competition laws may
make it impossible (or at least dangerous) for a firm to comply with the demands of a
particular host nation. In such a circumstance business opportunities may be lost
altogether.45
In addition, failure to adequately comply with concurrently applicable yet con-
tradictory national competition laws invites potentially conflicting legal orders. This
problem is especially acute when the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws is anticipated. The substantive content of U.S. antitrust law is ambiguous and
uncertain, and involves potential liability of gargantuan sums through trebled
damages4 6 and/or long term and highly intrusive injunctive relief. Business planning
is negatively affected by this threat because multinationals cannot accurately predict
whether new methods of doing business will result in unanticipated legal problems.
Risk-averse firms that respond to such an unstable environment by taking con-
servative, defensive postures are likely to hamper the efficiency of their operations.
The continuing presence of these inefficiencies frustrates the goal of fostering a
positive climate for international trade.
C. Consideration of the Legitimate Interests of Affected Nations
An enormous variance exists in the scope of applied competition law among the
great trading nations. In 1965 Zwarensteyn argued, "There is but little question that
the American antitrust laws contain little if any generally accepted principles of law
recognized by the international community of civilized nations."'47 Although the
quote overstates the case in the 1980s,4 8 it is clear that as applied U.S. antitrust law
reaches far beyond the trade practice law of many other Western industrialized
nations. 49 Outside the West the differences become stark. The policies underlying the
antitrust laws are completely inconsistent with the market concepts of Islamic and
developing third world economies.50 Similarly, U.S. competition policy is clearly in
direct conflict with the market philosophies of the Socialist countries.
5
'
Variations in the nature of competition policies assume significance because
45. If all multinational firms were subject to the same constraints, the host nation would have to either modify its
demands or lose the benefits of the business development. But multinationals are likely to be primarily influenced by the
laws of their chartering country. A Japanese firm doing little business in the U.S. might be quite willing to undertake an
opportunity in Australia even though it might be required to engage in activities in violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. A
U.S. based multinational might feel compelled to forfeit the opportunity.
46. In Westinghouse the sums exceeded $6 billion. See supra note 28. In Laker the plaintiff sought $1 billion. See
British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., 19831 3 W.L.R. 545.
47. Zwarensteyn, The Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws, 3 Am z. Bus. L.J. 163, 177 (1965).
48. See Baxter, Standards for the Application of United States Antitrust Law in an International Environment, 1982
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 841.
49. For example, the Court in Laker noted the conflict between the English and U.S. courts and commented that "its
sources are the fundamentally opposed national policies toward prohibition of anticompetitive business activity." Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
50. See infra text accompanying note 212.
51. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
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countries may give very different weights to the relative values of competition policy
versus social and political objectives. The U.S. consistently takes the position that the
antitrust laws are an integral component of the American economic system. Other
nations, however, give little or no weight to competition policy factors in taking or
encouraging actions that may have anticompetitive impacts within the U.S. Competi-
tion policy factors were presumably given no consideration in the formation of the
Arab boycott of Israel. 52 In the Westinghouse case, Australia accorded more weight
to the planned development and exploitation of its uranium resources than it did to
competition policy.5 3 In fact, it was argued by the amici in Westinghouse that the
U.S. Executive Branch had given a similar preference to resource, energy, and
defense policies over competition policy in its earlier decision to declare the U.S.
uranium market partially off-limits to foreign producers.5 4 In spite of this argument
the U.S. courts accorded competition policy overriding importance in the litigation. 55
Consider, for example, a nation wishing to exploit a prime natural resource. It
may decide, as a matter of national policy, to control the rate of extraction to
correspond with planned economic growth. Assuming that the resource is an impor-
tant source of foreign currency, the country may feel that its participation in whatever
arrangements are possible to extract the highest possible price for the commodity are
justified. The country may not have the capital or skill to extract the resource itself, or
may simply prefer that the extraction be done by private enterprise. In either event, it
may allow extraction by a private domestic corporation, or if there is none, it may
encourage multinationals to extract and/or market the commodity. Limitations may
be imposed upon the domestic or multinational corporations to insure compliance
with the country's resource development policies and to guarantee the effectiveness
of taxation strategies. Many of these policies or restrictions may violate the antitrust
laws of the U.S. They may also have substantial adverse effects within the U.S.
These effects can be engendered through the actions of private corporations rather
than through the direct action of the source country. For example, in the Westing-
house litigation, Australia, Canada, and South Africa controlled the export of ura-
nium in terms of quantity and price, and the defendant corporations extracted the
primary resource pursuant to such controls.
56
A nation-state's sovereignty legitimizes its actions that define and implement
policies in furtherance of its perceived national interest. Without the existence of an
52. See Note, The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of United States v. Bechtel in Light of the Export
Administration Amendments of 1977, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1440 (1979).
53. Amicus Memorandum of the Government of Australia at 2-4, In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138 (N.D. I11. 1979), affid, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
54. "It is evident that the United States Government, by imposing the embargo, took the view that U.S. general
antitrust interests in a free market in uranium should, in that instance, be subordinated to the need to protect U.S.
producers from foreign competition." Id. at 4.
55. In rendering the default judgment Judge Marshall was influenced by "the seriousness of the charges in the
complaint." In re Uranium Antitrust Litig, (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.), 1979-I Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,657, 77,710 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Ordering production of certain documents, Judge Marshall emphasized the importance
of competition to U.S. antitrust policy (citing United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)); see In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D. II1. 1979), aff'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
56. Pengilley, supra note 8, at 852.
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international consensus concerning the parameters of appropriate competition policy,
conflict between national legal systems will result. The fundamental difficulty is to
find a means by which the legitimate sovereign interests of affected nations can be
considered in the forum court.
The conflict between nations may be greater when antitrust enforcement is
initiated by private parties rather than by the government. Private parties may im-
plicate foreign policy concerns without evaluating considerations of comity that are
necessarily undertaken prior to the initiation of legal proceedings by the government.
It seems clear that the specter of treble damages in private suits is far more offensive
to foreign nations than any relief, civil or criminal, available to the government.57
Application of the "rule of reason," discussed below, 58 requires U.S. courts to
consider issues of comity in determining jurisdiction in private lawsuits. However,
two fundamental questions are related to this analysis.
First, how are the interests of the affected nation to be presented to the forum
court? Since the affected nations will not ordinarily be parties to the suit, they cannot
support their position through a direct involvement in the litigation.
Historically, affected nations communicated their objections to the assertion of
jurisdiction by U.S. courts to the U.S. Department of State, which then interceded, if
appropriate, on behalf of the protesting nation. 59 Recently, both the Department of
State and the Department of Justice have consistently encouraged affected nations to
submit their positions on the issues involved in the private litigation directly to the
courts as amici. 60 This procedure, however, falls far short of participation as a direct
party in the litigation. Among other handicaps, affected nations are not able to
develop evidence directly or adjust quickly to the changing context of a case. Instead,
they are left on the periphery.
It may be argued that private defendants should be expected to develop the case
57. The following argument is typical:
Foreign criticism of the reach of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction is not new. It accompanied some of the government's
anti-cartel cases in the 1940's and 1950's. However, there has been an acute rise in the level of concern and
friction in recent years. Sharp protests have been addressed to the United States government and legislation has
been enacted in several countries to limit discovery and/or block or nullify enforcement of U.S. judgments
reached as a result of what is thought to be a too expansive view of American antitrust jurisdiction.
This increased concern can be ascribed to a number of elements, but a salient factor has been the volume
and impact of private antitrust litigation. This does not mean that the reach of government enforcement is
accepted. But concern about it is tempered by the fact that many other industrial nations have their own antitrust
programs, and that procedures for inter-governmental consultation have been developed that assure a level of
consideration of foreign interests. No such procedures, of course, apply to private litigation; and private litigants
have no incentive to moderate their claims or tactics because of foreign concerns.
ABA, Report to the House of Delegates from the International Law Committee Recommending U.S. Participation as
Amicus Curiae In Certain Private Antitrust Litigation 1-2 (April 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
58. See infra text accompanying notes 108-57.
59. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 2(A)(1) introductory
note (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as REvIsED RESTATEMENT]. There have been five drafts of the REvisED
RESTA-EMENT. Citations to §§ 402-418 and §§ 441-460 refer to Tent. Draft No. 2 (1981); §§ 401,419-420 to Tent. Draft
No. 3 (1982); §§ 428-429 to Tent. Draft No. 4 (1983); and § 445 to Tent. Draft No. 5 (1984). See also letter from Roberts
B. Owen, Legal Advisor, Department of State to John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General (March 17, 1980)
(relating to the Westinghouse litigation) [hereinafter cited as Owen] (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
60. REvtsED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 403 reporter's note 6; Owen, supra note 59 (asking Shenefield to make
known to the court the United States Government's position of encouraging foreign governments to present their views to
the court as amici curiae).
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for the affected nation; sometimes that will happen. But private defendants cannot be
relied upon to advocate adequately the foreign national interests involved in every
case and context. Often, the interests of the private defendant will not coincide
precisely with those of the affected nation. The private defendant may even refuse to
appear and may be subject to a default judgment, as happened in the Westinghouse
litigation.
Even if an affected nation does effectively explain its interests, the second, more
pragmatic problem remains: how are the interests to be evaluated by the forum court?
Consider, for example, the extraction and sale of uranium. An affected nation may
argue that it has the absolute right to control the rate at which uranium ore is
extracted, the manner in which it is marketed, the environmental conditions under
which it is mined and delivered, and possible future uses of the potentially dangerous
commodity which may have, among other things, military implications. Further, the
affected nation may argue that it is well within its rights to exercise control through an
independent corporate agent rather than through direct governmental involvement.
In a U.S. antitrust case, these interests will be interposed against the policies
underlying the antitrust laws of the U.S. The significance of American public policy,
expressed by its antitrust laws, was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in its
Topco decision:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is
the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion and ingenuity what-
ever economic muscle it can muster.6'
How are these competing interests to be balanced? The great disparity in the
nature of the policies involved makes effective balancing problematic at best. How
should an affected nation's policy to control the marketing and development of
uranium be balanced against the value of U.S. competition policy? Evaluations of
this type are fraught with political and ephemeral elements. Further, a court will have
a difficult task being objective when it compares the relative values of the goals
reflected in laws within its own legal system and a foreign government's policies that
may impose a significant cost within the forum state. Yet, appropriate consideration
must be given to the affected nation's sovereign interests.
D. Efficient Interaction of National Legal Systems
Significant problems handicap the efficient interaction of the legal systems of
the world's sovereign nations. A standard problem in international law arises from
"concurrent jurisdiction." This involves a defendant facing the dilemma of directly
contradicting orders from different courts, both having personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. A forum court may assert jurisdiction and enter a judgment against the
61. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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defendant. Simultaneously, a court in a chartering or affected nation may refuse to
implement the order or may issue a countering or preempting order.
62
There is no international constitution with a "full faith and credit" proviso.
Cooperative interaction among national legal systems is dependent upon voluntary
actions-and restraint. Variances in rules pertaining to jurisdiction, discovery, attor-
ney's fees, damages, and evidence will complicate legal system interaction.
63
National courts will always be greatly influenced by the policies inherent in the
substantive law of their own legal system. Forum courts can be expected to con-
sistently undervalue the conflicting policies of other nations. Power, whether legal,'
economic, political, or even moral, will determine the forum court's ability to en-
force a judgment at odds with the interests of a foreign sovereign.
E. Conclusion
Coordinated extra-territorial application of competition law is an essential com-
ponent of an efficient world legal system. In addition to havens resulting from
conflicting national policies are what might best be described as natural havens.
Certain actions carefully positioned in the air or on the seas may fall outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of any authority. Cooperative extra-territoriality is required to
reach these transactions, especially when they violate common legal proscriptions of
the affected nations.
On the other hand, aggressive unilateral assertion of extra-territoriality ex-
acerbates tensions between differing legal systems. Without the quid pro quo of a
mutual commitment to an acceptable multilateral system, nations will naturally object
to the assertion of foreign judicial authority against their nationals when important
economic or political policies are involved.
Conflict of law analysis is not the panacea seen by some. 65 The generally
successful U.S. experience with conflicts law has been based on a common legal
heritage linked by constitutional principles and mediated by an authoritative federal
Supreme Court. These ingredients are not present in the international community.
Further, the conflicting policies at issue in the U.S. domestic cases (typically private
tort actions in which the state government has only an indirect interest) rarely reach
the significance of the affected nations' interests in cases like Westinghouse.
We now turn to the limiting judicial principles that have been employed by the
62. See. e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (finding violation of
Sherman Act); British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [1953] 1 Ch. 19 (Ch. Div'l Ct. 1952). The
same problem was posed in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
63. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways (Laker v. Pan Am), 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1132-34
(D.D.C. 1983), aff d, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
64. Legal power in this context involves the ability of the forum court to directly enforce its judgment against
personnel and assets of a defendant or to induce the courts of another jurisdiction to enforce its judgment there. In its
broadest sense legal power would include peripheral means of enforcing orders by the establishment of administrative
restrictions on imports and other trade.
65. See Baxter, supra note 48; infra text accompanying notes 129 and note 138.
1984]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
U.S. courts in determining whether to assert jurisdiction when the requisite effects
are present, and evaluate them under the criteria set forth in part III of this Article.
IV. LIMITING JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES
The U.S. courts have adopted limiting judicial doctrines that circumscribe the
assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, despite the presence of substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effects on U.S. commerce. As demonstrated below, these doctrines are of
very limited application and have done little to resolve the concerns of foreign
governments about the extra-territoriality issue or to satisfy the goals set forth in part
III of this Article.
The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) has focused on the extra-territoriality issue
both in its 1965 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States66 and more recently in its Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-5 of the Proposed Revised
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised
Restatement). 67 The A.L.I. Restatements represent efforts not only to distill current
judicial principles applicable to the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws,
but also to articulate what those principles should be. The Revised Restatement, the
A.L.I.'s most current formulation, suggests some major modifications to existing
limiting judicial principles. These modifications, however, also fail to satisfy the
parameters set out above.
A. The Sovereignty-Related Defenses
The U.S. courts have developed a number of judicial defenses applicable to
cases that impinge most directly on a foreign government's sovereignty. These
"sovereignty-related" defenses are the familiar doctrines of foreign sovereign im-
munity, act of state, and foreign sovereign compulsion.
Foreign sovereign immunity is a long-established limiting doctrine. At early
common law, a foreign sovereign was considered absolutely immune from the ju-
dicial processes of another state. 68 The sole question became whether or not the
defendant was actually a foreign sovereign or its agent.
As international trade developed, the operation of the doctrine produced inequi-
ties. If the doctrine applied to nationalized businesses, all commercial activities of the
socialist countries would be exempt from antitrust enforcement. The same activities
carried out by unsheltered private corporations, however, would be subject to
enforcement.
The defense of sovereign immunity is now governed by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 69 The courts, regardless of their jurisdiction to
prescribe, do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a case against a sovereign or its
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965) [hereinafter cited as
1965 RESTATEMENT].
67. REVISED RETATmENT, supra note 59.
68. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
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instrumentality. 70 The FSIA codified an exception for "commercial activity," pro-
viding that a foreign sovereign will not be immune from jurisdiction when its com-
mercial activity has a direct effect within the U.S. 7 Whether conduct qualifies as
"commercial activity" is to "be determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."72
The precise delineation of the commercial/governmental distinction must await con-
tinued interpretation of the statute. The trend is toward narrowing the scope of this
defense.
73
The Revised Restatement draft adopts this "restrictive theory of im-
munity . . . which distinguishes between 'governmental activity' (de jure imperii)
and activities of the kind that may also be carried on by private persons (de jure
gestionis)." 74 It deems as "commercial" activities "concerned with the production,
sale, or purchase of goods; hiring or leasing of property; borrowing or lending of
money; performance of or contracting for the performance of services; and similar
activities" regardless of their purpose.75
A second defense is the act of state doctrine. Under this doctrine a U.S. court is
precluded from examining the validity of a foreign sovereign's public acts im-
plemented within its own territory. 76 The rationale underlying this defense shifted
from notions of sovereignty to the twin policies of separation of powers-it is the
executive's role to set foreign policy-and judicial restraint in the foreign policy
field. 77 While the act of state doctrine is similar to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in that it also recognizes the need to respect a foreign state's sovereignty, it is a
significantly different doctrine. The law of sovereign immunity goes directly to the
jurisdiction of the court. The act of state doctrine is not jurisdictional, but rather is a
prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in a sensitive area. Moreover,
only states themselves, as defendants, may claim sovereign immunity. On the other
70. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ... in applying the restrictive theory of immunity from adjudica-
tion and permitting certain categories of suits against foreign states, assumes that foreign states are not immune
from U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe the substantive law underlying those suits, and that that law was intended to
apply to the foreign state defendant.
REvisED RpssrArF.mENr, supra note 59, § 445 comment (h) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).
72. Id. § 1603(d).
73. In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978), the court allowed an antitrust suit to
proceed against Pezetel, a Polish exporter of golfearts, even though Pezetel was an "instrumentality" of the Polish
government in the context of the nation's state-controlled economy. The court held that under FSIA a sovereign was
subject to the antitrust laws when engaged in commercial activity, and assuming arguendo that Pezetel's acts were those
of government, those acts must be characterized by reference to the transaction itself (commercial) rather than by
reference to its purpose. Id. at 395; see Note, "'Commercial Activirv" in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 163 (1979).
74. REvIsED RE TATEE.T, supra note 59, § 451 comment (a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
75. Id. § 453 comment (b).
76. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign State is bound to respect the in-
dependence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.").
77. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) ("The doctrine as formulated in past decisions
expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of
state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a
whole in the international sphere."). Although based on notions of separation of powers the defense is not constitutionally
mandated. See infra note 247.
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hand, a private litigant may invoke the act of state doctrine even when no sovereign
state is a party to the action.
78
The act of state doctrine is subject to a number of qualifications that attenuate its
utility as a "limiting principle." A major qualification is territorial-it applies only
to the acts of a foreign state within its own territory. A second qualification is found
in the need to characterize "acts" as "acts of state." Nationalization and expropri-
ation decrees have traditionally been regarded as acts of state. However, the "mere"
issuance of patents by foreign governments, 79 the enforcement of a security interest
by foreign courts, 8" the procurement of discriminatory foreign legislation, 8' and the
withholding of a timber cutting license 82 are not considered acts of state.
Uncertainty surrounds the existence of a third qualification. A plurality of the
Supreme Court recognized an exception to the defense for purely commercial activity
in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba,8 3 but only four justices concurred in that
section of the opinion. The Department of Justice also adopted the position that "the
act of state defense does not apply to the 'commercial' actions of a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality, but only to its public, political actions." 8 4
A series of recent Ninth Circuit decisions have cast some doubt on the exis-
tence of a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine. In Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)85 the Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he act of state doctrine is not
diluted by the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. "86 The Ninth Circuit has since retreated from that extreme position,
stating in its most recent decision that "the Ninth Circuit has not definitively ruled on
the commercial exception." ' 87 The court's more recent position may reflect the mod-
78. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
79. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
80. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of An., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976).
81. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
82. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
83. 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976) (Justice White wrote: "the concept of an act of state should not be extended to include
the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentali-
ties.").
84. D.O.J. GUIDE, supra note 21, at 55.
85. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
86. Id. at 1360. The court reasoned:
While purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an act of state, certain seemingly commercial
activity will trigger act of state considerations .... While the FSIA ignores the underlying purpose of a state's
action, the act of state doctrine does not .... When the state qua state acts in the public interest, its sovereignty
is asserted. The courts must proceed cautiously to avoid an affront to that sovereignty. Because the act of state
doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity address different concerns and apply in different circumstances,
we find that the act of state doctrine remains available when such caution is appropriate, regardless of any
commercial component of the activity involved.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
87. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983). cert. denied. 104 S. Ct.
703 (1984); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983). The court in Clarco
noted that "[tlhe Dunhill plurality emphasized that a commercial exception is appropriate in situations where governments
are not exercising power peculiar to sovereigns." 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1983). However, the commercial exception
would not be applicable to the "[glranting [of] a concession to exploit natural resources [which] entails an exercise of
powers peculiar to a sovereign." Id. at 408. The act of state doctrine has been successfully invoked in only three antitrust
cases, all relating to oil. In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), plaintiffs alleged that the sovereign issued a fraudulent
ANTITRUST EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY
erating effects of its subsequent adoption of the rule of reason analysis discussed
below. 88
The OPEC case is of special interest because it represents the most extreme
attempt to apply U.S. antitrust laws extra-territorially. Such an application was
avoided only by the Ninth Circuit's creative application of the act of state doctrine.
The OPEC case involved an antitrust challenge, by an American labor union, to the
international oil cartel established by OPEC and its member nations. The appellate
court held that the case was properly dismissed under the act of state doctrine. s9 The
court found that OPEC's price-fixing activity, although commercial, had a significant
sovereign component. 90 Furthermore, the availability of oil had become a significant
factor in international relations, and there was no international consensus condemn-
ing cartels, royalties, and production agreements, especially when a prime natural
resource like oil was involved.
One final issue remains regarding the scope of the act of state defense. The
Second Circuit, on the premise that to prove damages an antitrust plaintiff must show
that but for the conspiracy the foreign government would not have acted as it did,
held in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.9 ' that this evidentiary requirement would justify
extending the act of state doctrine to preclude an inquiry into the motivation as well as
the validity of the foreign state's action. 92 The Fifth Circuit criticized Hunt in In-
dustrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. 9 3 The Fifth Circuit not only
disagreed with the underlying premise of Hunt that a plaintiff must prove defendants
were the sole cause to establish a causal relation for purposes of proving damages, but
went on to rule that: "Furthermore, we disagree that motivation and validity are
equally protected by the act of state rubric .... Precluding all inquiry into the
motivation behind or circumstances surrounding the sovereign act would uselessly
thwart legitimate American goals where adjudication would result in no embarrass-
ment to executive department action."-
94
territorial decree to enable defendants, in the place of plaintiffs, to exploit oil and gas in the area covered by the decree. In
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1978), Nelson Bunker Hunt claimed
that the defendant conspired with other major oil companies to cause the Libyan government to nationalize Hunt's oil
production rights. Both cases involved expropriation by a foreign state, the classic situation for the invocation of the act of
state doctrine. In the third case, Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of an oil
concession by bribing officials of Umm Al Qaywayn.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 108-115.
89. 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
90. Id. at 1360.
91. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
92. Id. at 76-78.
93. 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980). In Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), a case that involved allegations of
bribery, the Ninth Circuit rejected Clayco's claim that the court should not invoke the act of state doctrine "because the
concern here is the motivation behind the sovereign's act, rather than its legal validity." Id. at 407. The Ninth Circuit,
reviewing Mitsui, held that:
[it) does not foreclose application of the act of state doctrine to cases where motivation but not validity must be
scrutinized. Rather, Mitsui holds that where the motivation for the sovereign act would be subject to a limited
examination in order to measure the plaintiff's damages, and the adjudication "'would result in no embarrass-
ment to executive department action," inquiry is not foreclosed by the act of state doctrine. In this case,
however, the very existence of plaintiffs' claim depends upon establishing that the motivation for the sovereign
act was bribery, thus embarrassment would result from adjudication.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980) (citation omitted).
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The Revised Restatement does little to clarify or modify the scope of this
defense. It adopts the traditional formulation of the act of state doctrine, including its
rigid territorial limitation that it applies only to "act[s] of a foreign state ... within
the state's own territory." 95 It also does not attempt to resolve the two outstanding
issues with respect to this defense: the existence of a "commercial activities" ex-
ception96 and whether the act of state doctrine forecloses review of the motivation for
the sovereign's public acts as well as the validity of its actions.97
A corollary to the act of state defense is the foreign compulsion defense-that
private conduct in foreign territory compelled by a foreign sovereign should be
treated as an act of the state itself and protected from antitrust liability. The argument
is premised on the twin notions of sovereignty and fairness. In Intramerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,98 defendants allegedly refused to sell Venezuelan
crude oil to plaintiff, a U.S. importer and refiner. 99 The Venezuelan government's
imposition of a boycott forbidding crude oil sales was held to constitute a complete
defense. 10o The Texaco Maracaibo case represents the only successful invocation of
this defense to date. It should be noted that the Department of Justice takes the
position that Texaco Maracaibo was wrongly decided, in part because the conduct on
95. REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 428 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983). Section 428 provides that "the United
States will refrain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state taken in its sovereign capacity within the state's
own territory." (emphasis added). The REVISED RESTATEtiENT thus incorporates the two primary limitations to the
availability of the defense. First, the acts of the sovereign must be public acts "such as constitutional amendments,
statutes, decrees and proclamations, and possibly ... physical acts such as occupation of an estate by the state's armed
forces in application of state policy." Id. comment (g). Second is the rigid territorial limitation: "It is clear that the act of
state doctrine applies only to acts of a foreign state within its own territory." Id. comment (a)(i). See also id. reporter's
note 7.
96. The reporter's notes, referring to the plurality opinion in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976), noted that one reason for recognizing a commercial activities exception is "the fact that in commercial dealings,
as contrasted with matters such as expropriation, there is a broad international consensus as to the applicable rules of
law." REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 428 reporter's note 5. The reporter appears to distinguish International
Ass'n of Machinists v. The Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1163 (1982) (see supra text accompanying notes 85-87), asserting that the Ninth Circuit invoked the defense "since
OPEC and its activities 'are carefully considered in the formulation of American foreign policy,' and since any relief
granted to plaintiffs 'would in effect amount to an order from a domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its
chosen means of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources."' REVISED RESTATFtENr, supra note
59, § 428 reporter's note 5. Experience in antitrust litigation demonstrates the absence, not the presence, of "a broad
international consensus as to the applicable rules of law" in commercial dealings. OPEC clearly involved "commercial
activities"-price fixing and regulation of output-and the court there noted the absence of an international consensus
regarding the legality of such activities in the context of prime natural resources. International Ass'n of Machinists v. The
Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
97. Section 428, by its terms, speaks only of validity. But reporter's note 10 implies that review of motivation may
also be precluded:
When the causal chain between defendant's alleged conduct and plaintiff's injury could not be determined
without an inquiry into the motives of the foreign government, the defense has been successful and the cause of
action has been dismissed. Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation,
550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain
Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979). When defendant's
conduct could be judged without scrutiny of the acts or motives of the foreign government, the act of state
doctrine has not been applied. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assoc.,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation, 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979); Industrial Investment Development Corporation v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
98. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
99. Id. at 1292-93.
100. Id. at 1298.
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which the complaint was based (refusal to deal with plaintiff) took place in the U.S.,
and the defense exists only for acts compelled within the foreign government's own
territory.' 0 1
Presumably, the compulsion must occur through an action that would qualify as
an affirmative act of state. Mere approval after the fact of an illegal action will not
invoke the doctrine.10 2 Also, the defendant must be coerced and cannot be in a
position in which it could refuse to comply.' 0 3 The Revised Restatement's version of
the foreign government compulsion defense' 0 4 again fails to address the short-
comings of this defense. It retains the basic requirements that the defense be limited
territorially105 and that the acts be "compelled" by the sovereign.1
0 6
The trend has been to limit the ability of defendants in extra-territorial suits to
invoke the three traditional doctrines of sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign
101. D.O.J. GUIDE, supra note 21, case K, at 50-52. The REvISED REsTATEmENT concurs with the conclusion of the
Department of Justice that Texas Maracaibo was incorrectly decided. REVISED RESTATFMENT, supra note 59, § 419
reporter's note 5 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982).
102. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927).
103. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
104. REVisED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 419 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). Section 420 deals with the specific
application of the foreign compulsion defense in the context of discovery jurisdiction. It provides that when a party is
subject to a discovery order by the forum nation and to a blocking statute or its equivalent by the affected nation there may
be a qualified defense. The party subject to a blocking statute or its equivalent may be required to make a good faith effort
to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available, and even when such good faith efforts
have failed the court may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to that party. Id. § 420(2). This is justified
on the grounds that an adverse finding "is not deemed to be a penalty for conduct commanded by a foreign state, but is
designed rather as a form of pressure to induce compliance with justified requests for information.'" Id. § 420 comment
(e).
105. Id. § 419 comment (b).
106. The REVIsED RESTATmurE places heavy emphasis on the element of compulsion, which exists "only when
the other state's requirements are embodied in binding laws or regulations subject to penal or other severe sanction." Id.
§ 419 comment (e). The comment makes clear that this is a particularly difficult hurdle to overcome in the antitrust
context:
Numerous arrangements, seen by plaintiffs in U.S. antitrust cases as anticompetitive combinations, have been
viewed by defendants (and sometimes by foreign governments as well) as arrangements required or directed by
foreign states and therefore immune from antitrust liability in the United States. In order for the foreign
compulsion defense to be effective, however, it is not enough that the government of a foreign state tolerated or
licensed the activity at issue, that it gave an exclusive franchise to a participant in a combination, or even that a
foreign state-owned entity itself participated in the activity. To prevail under the government compulsion
defense, defendants must establish that the activity on which liability is sought to be based was required by the
foreign state.
Id. § 419 comment (d). The reporter's notes specifically apply § 419 to the Westinghouse litigation with the following
results:
In a series of lawsuits growing out of the establishment of an international uranium cartel in the 1970's, several
parties raised the defense that participation of all Canadian uranium producers in the cartel was a matter of
national policy required by the government of Canada. As of 1981 there had been no definitive ruling on the
defense, because it had become intertwined in several courts with controversies about discovery of information
located outside the United States .... [T]he defense of government compulsion would prevail only on a
showing that the government of Canada required all producers in that country to join the cartel, on penalty of
criminal sanction, risk of losing their mining rights or similar threats. A showing that the government of Canada
had (i) known about and acquiesced in the cartel; (ii) favored and supported the cartel as a matter of policy; and
(iii) itself owned one or more participants in the cartel (crown corporations) would not be sufficient to establish
the defense of government compulsion in the United States under this section. The facts cited might, however,
be relevant under § 403 on the issue of the reasonableness of application of United States law, as well as on the
appropriateness of any remedy or sanction.
Id. § 419 reporter's note 4 (citations omitted).
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government compulsion. 10 7 Thus, these defenses alone cannot avoid a conflict when
a foreign government is sued because of commercial activities, or when a private
party is sued and the challenged conduct was encouraged by that foreign government.
B. The "Rule of Reason"
In seminal decisions, two U.S. circuit courts have held that the "effects test"
limited by the sovereignty-related defenses approach is inadequate, and that addition-
al factors should be considered when a court is deciding whether to assert subject
matter jurisdiction. The first of these decisions, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,108 was rendered in 1976, although the balancing test contained therein was
suggested almost twenty years earlier by Kingman Brewster10 9 and was included in
the 1965 Restatement. 110
In Timberlane the primary plaintiff, an American partnership engaged in the
107. A fourth possible defense is the Noerr.Pennington doctrine. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers (UMW) v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Under this doctrine, "[jloint efforts to influence
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition." UMW v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). This applies to the "petitioning" of any branch of the government. This immunity does not
extend, however, to conduct ostensibly directed toward influencing the government, but which is in reality "a mere sham
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor." Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). Courts and commentators
are divided on the issue of whether this immunity applies to efforts to influence foreign governments. For example, it has
been held in the Ninth Circuit that the Noerr immunity does not apply extra-territorially. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972). The court reasoned that Noerr rested on the first amendment and on the need for a representative democracy to
keep in touch with its constituents. Thus, "[t]he constitutional freedom 'to petition the Government' carries limited if
indeed any applicability to the petitioning of foreign governments," especially when, as in that case, the "persuasion" of
the foreign government "is a far cry from the political process with which Noerr was concerned." Id. at 107-08. The
Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the Noerr immunity does apply to attempts to influence foreign gov-
ernments. Coastal States Mkt., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1365 (5th Cir. 1983). The court concluded that "Noerr was
based on a construction of the Sherman Act. It was not a first amendment decision." Id. at 1364-65 (footnotes omitted).
The court wrote:
The Sherman Act, as interpreted by Noerr, simply does not penalize as an antitrust violation the petitioning of a
government agency. We see no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in the United States should
in a United States court become evidence of illegal conduct because performed abroad. We also reject the idea
that the availability of petitioning immunity turns on the political "persuasion" of the government involved.
The political character of the government to which the petition is addressed should not taint the right to enlist its
aid.
Id. at 1366-67 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court has not yet spoken directly to the issue. However, in Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1972), the Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict for the
defendants, stating that "Noerr ... is plainly inapposite." Id. at 707. Because the Court distinguished the Noerr
doctrine, rather than holding it inapplicable, it has been argued that the Court decided sub silentio that it does apply. See
Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Lawv, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132
(1967); see also Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 882 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1982). The Department of
Justice also takes the position that the doctrine is not limited to domestic litigation. D.O.J. GUtDE, supra note 21, at
62-63.
108. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
109. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).
110. 1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 66. Section 40 of the 1965 RESTATEMENT proposes that the courts consider the
following criteria:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person;
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state;
(d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with
the rule prescribed by that state.
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purchase and wholesaling of lumber, alleged that the San Francisco-based Bank of
America conspired with a number of Honduran companies to freeze plaintiff out of
the Honduran lumber market by foreclosing, in a Honduran court, on a Honduran
lumber company acquired by Timberlane. "' In its antitrust suit Timberlane alleged
that U.S. commerce was affected because Timberlane intended to export part of the
Honduran lumber to the U.S. The district court dismissed the antitrust claims under
the act of state doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit, in a decision by Judge Choy, reversed and remanded. Judge
Choy suggested a "tripartite" jurisdictional test: first, "the antitrust laws re-
quire . . . that there be some effect-actual or intended--on American foreign com-
merce before the federal courts may legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction
under those statutes." 112 The second factor, which breaks down the effects test into a
quantitative dimension, is essentially a test of standing: "Second, a greater showing
of burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently
large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of
the antitrust laws." 13 The third factor, which considers qualitative aspects, is pro-
phylactic and multidimensional: "Third, there is the additional question which is
unique to the international setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United
States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are
sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of ex-
traterritorial authority.""114 Expanding on this third part of the test the court then
invoked Kingman Brewster's jurisdictional rule of reason balancing approach and
considered the following factors:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the
parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to
which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent
to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability
of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad."15
On remand, the district court dismissed Timberlane's action under this rule of
reason analysis. 116 The trial court first looked to the anticompetitive effects of de-
fendants' action, "including whether they occurred in the U.S. or in Honduras;
whether the markets affected were in the U.S. or abroad; and whether any indirect
anticompetitive effects in the U.S. or abroad were foreseeable or intended." 117 The
111. Timberlane had acquired a financially ailing company called Lima. Bank of America allegedly filed lawsuits in
Honduras through its Honduran subsidiary, obtaining a Honduran court order enforcing an outstanding security interest
and having the Honduran government seize Lima's plant. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 601-05
(9th Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at 613 (emphasis in original).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 616.
116. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983). This case was recently affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., No. 83-2008 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1984). See 48 ANTrrRusT &
TRADE REG. RE'. (BNA) No. 1197, at 87 (Jan. 10, 1985).
117. Id. at 1465.
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court found the Ninth Circuit's "very low threshold" effects test barely satisfied. "8
The court then looked to the relationship between plaintiffs suit and the forum, and
considered "whether U.S. citizenship of, or ownership interests in, the plaintiff are
significant factors militating our jurisdiction, or whether the plaintiff's access to or
recourse in a foreign court has provided it meaningful opportunities for redress of its
allegations." 119 The court found plaintiff's links to the U.S. insignificant, and further
found that the Honduran courts had provided plaintiff with adequate recourse. 120 The
court finally considered the effect of the lawsuit on U.S. foreign policy, looking at
both "the anticipatable annoyance or infringement that Honduras might feel if rulings
in this matter were to have the effect, albeit indirectly, of rendering an 'advisory'
judgment on the state of their domestic lumber industry; and the broader implications
of an unwarranted export of our antitrust laws to Honduras." ' 2' The court found the
anticipated infringement on Honduras' highly regulated timber industry, a prime
natural resource, to be great. The broader implications of the extra-territorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws were unclear. '
22
In the second case, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 123 the Third
Circuit also adopted a comity analysis, balancing a number of disparate factors. In
Mannington Mills both the plaintiff and defendant were in the business of man-
ufacturing vinyl floor covering. Mannington alleged that Congoleum fraudulently
118. The trial court found that plaintiffs had just adequately alleged some unintended effect upon U.S. foreign
commerce, finding that plaintiffs were "potential competitors" in the markets that they alleged were actually, or were
intended to be, rendered anticompetitive-supplying lumber to two submarkets in the U.S.:
Here, given the indisputably nascent efforts of the plaintiffs to establish a chain of somewhat related enterprises
to produce lumber in Honduras, with an eye to eventual export, if ever legally and commercially feasible, the
directly anticompetitive effect of the Bank's decision to liquidate Lima's indebtedness was felt in the market-
place in which the Lima assets supplied lumber: Honduras and, to a far less degree, the Caribbean. Although
Lima and the Timberlane entities may have consummated some sales in Puerto Rico and negotiated toward
others in Florida, any effect that Lima's demise had upon competitive conditions in the U.S. foreign was de
minimis.
... The minimal commercial opportunity for Honduran lumber in the U.S. is important to our assessment of
whether the Bank's actions could have been intentionally directed at, or their effect predictable upon, U.S.
commerce in lumber.
Id. at 1470 (footnotes omitted). This failure to satisfy the "effects" test may have been the real reason for dismissal.
119. Id. at 1465. The court further noted:
[T]he true nature of the complaint is an action in tort and contract by the Limas against certain personnel of the
Bank's branch in Honduras. At best, the United States citizens' interests in the matter are derivative: Timberlane
to the Lima concern, Bank of America in San Francisco, as the parent corporation. All of the crucial percipient
witnesses to the incidents were either Honduran citizens or residents; almost all of the events which form the
basis of this suit occurred in Honduras.
Id. at 1469-70.
120. The court noted that Lima, not Timberlane, was within the" 'target area' of anticompetitive animus," and that
Timberlane's claims were derivative so that there was a possibility of duplicate recovery and complex damage apportion-
ment. Id. at 1468. The court noted that treble damages in this case would penalize the bank only for its status as a U.S.
national. The court also noted that treble damages would subject all multinationals to multiple liability, especially to
liability under U.S. laws, provided a U.S. entity could be found. Id.
121. Id. at 1465 (footnotes omitted).
122. The court also noted the submission of a Diplomatic Note by Honduras that "expresse[d] some concern" about
the American lawsuit. Id. at 1465 n.31. The court then concluded that consideration of Timberlane's allegations would
"create needless tensions." "[The] U.S. Court would by necessity have to overlook the practical sensitivity of our
interference, which in any degree, would be superfluous, with an industry heavily regulated by another sovereign state, as
well as in an internal incident which has already consumed extensive Honduran judicial resources." Id. at 1471 (emphasis
added).
123. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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obtained and enforced patents in twenty-six foreign countries, restricting the foreign
business of Mannington in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 124 The
trial court dismissed on the basis of the act of state doctrine. The Third Circuit
reversed the trial court's holding, 25 finding the act of state doctrine inapplicable, and
remanded for a "rule of reason" analysis. The Third Circuit found itself in "sub-
stantial agreement" with the Timberlane court. However, the Third Circuit proposed
a slightly different list of factors to be considered in the balancing process:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.' 26
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this "rule of reason" analysis. How-
ever, many commentators have embraced this additional limiting doctrine. 127 The
Antitrust Division's Guide for International Operations implicitly adopts the balanc-
ing approach, 128 although it does not expressly refer to either decision. Current and
past Department officials have also endorsed the position that conflicts of laws
analysis and principles of comity should be brought to bear in cases in which jurisdic-
tion is claimed over acts occurring abroad. 129
The "rule of reason" approach, however, is not universally acclaimed. In
Westinghouse, for example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's assertion
of jurisdiction even though the lower court declined to apply a "rule of reason"
analysis.1
30
The overlapping but not identical formulations of the relevant criteria proposed
by the circuit courts in Timberlane and Mannington Mills are extremely general and
124. Id. at 1290.
125. The court held that the mere issuance of patents could not be considered an "act of state." Id. at 1293-94.
126. Id. at 1297-98.
127. See, e.g., 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRusT LAw 239 (1978).
128. D.O.J. GUIDE, supra note 21, at 6-7 ("[Tlhe U.S. antitrust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction
when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce; and, consistent with these ends, it should
avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign nations.").
129. Rosenthal, An Overview of tie Guide and its Objectives, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTrIRuST AND OTHER LAws 87-89 (J. Griffin ed. 1979); Hawk, Special Defenses and Issues,
Including Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Act of State Doctrine, Foreign Government Compulsion and Sovereign Immunity,
50 AN'rrRusT L.J. 559, 562 (1981).
130. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affd, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th
Cir. 1980).
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abstract. Moreover, no guidance is provided on the relative weight to be given the
various factors.
The criteria identified by the courts can be separated into three basic categories:
legal, economic, and political.
LEGAL ECONOMIC POLITICAL
conflict with foreign law effect within U.S. conflict with foreign policy
nationality of parties foreseeability of effect effect of asserting jurisdic-
tion on foreign relations
availability of a remedy
abroad and pendency of relative importance of effect
litigation there within U.S. vs. foreign
country
whether remedy can be en-
forced relative importance of con-
duct within U.S. vs. foreign
whether issue is covered by country
treaty
conduct within U.S.
purpose to harm U.S. trade
Courts have a great deal of experience in dealing with economic questions. By
definition they are authoritative regarding legal questions. The critical unresolved
issue involves the political questions and their appropriate resolution.
Courts will have no reference points when analyzing the political questions.
Precedent is of little value because foreign relations and policies constantly shift and
change. Without the availability of legislative or judicial guideposts, the trial courts
will create their own foreign policy. As currently structured, there will be no controls
to insure that judicial foreign policy is consistent with the foreign policy of the
executive branch.
The Mannington Mills case provides a prime example of the impossible task set
before the federal district courts. In Mannington Mills the district court was instructed
upon reversal to apply the balancing test in seriatim to the patent laws of twenty-six
foreign countries. Affected nations might not react favorably to an outcome in which
U.S. antitrust law is held to be superior to the patent laws of fifteen of the foreign
nations but inferior to the other eleven. Such a listing of preferred and less preferred
foreign interests would more likely increase, not decrease, international conflicts.
Additionally, it is unclear whether this "rule of reason" should be treated as
"jurisdictional" or "discretionary." In a concurring opinion in Mannington Mills
Judge Adams argued that the test established in Timberlane is a test of subject matter
jurisdiction. 131 Most commentators and courts, and the 1965 Restatement, view the
rule of reason as nonjurisdictional, to be applied as a matter of comity.' 32
131. 595 F.2d 1287, 1300-02 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
132. 1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 40; see, e.g.. Hawk, supra note 129, at 662.
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Concerning who should carry the burden of proof on these issues, Brewster
proposed that "[t]he burden of establishing any of these jurisdictional requirements
should be borne by the plaintiff. When more than one element is involved, proof of
one of these should not operate to raise a presumption that the other exists." 133 While
at least one court has put the burden of proof on the plaintiff, 134 the Fifth Circuit
placed the burden on the defendant.'
31
The Revised Restatement proposes several modifications to this rule of reason
analysis. It combines the "effects principle" with the "principle of reasonableness"
and articulates a single jurisdictional standard 136 for the extra-territorial application of
U.S. laws. It also reformulates the factors to be considered by the courts. The
"effects principle," as set out in section 402 of the Revised Restatement, provides
that a state may "exercise jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law with respect
to . . . conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory." 137 This is a very broad articulation of the test, since it allows a
finding of jurisdiction upon a showing of either actual or intended effects. On the
other hand, the "principle of reasonableness" found in section 403 is a limiting
doctrine. Section 403(2) requires a court to evaluate "all the relevant factors"
including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or (ii)
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the in-
ternational system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.' 3
This list of factors is "not exhaustive" and "[t]he weight to be given to any
particular factor or group of factors will depend on all the circumstances." ' 139 The
Revised Restatement also proposes in section 403(3) that the courts apply a com-
133. K. Brewster, supra note 109, at 448.
134. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1461 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
135. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S.
Ct. 1244, affd on remand, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983).
136. REVisED RESTATmENT, supra note 59, § 403 reporter's note 10.
137. Id. § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
138. Id. § 403(2). These factors are derived, in part, from § 40 of the 1965 REsTATEMENT, and in part, from § 6 of
the REsrATEFmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws [hereinafter cited as CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT]. Reliance on the
CoNFucs RESTATEMENT reflects the trend toward viewing the extra-territoriality issue as one of conflicts of law.
139. REvIsED RESTATEMEN-r, supra note 59, § 403 comment (b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
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parative test of reasonableness in cases of "concurrent jurisdiction," when two states
having jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to the same party under section 403(2)
issue contradictory commands to that party.In°
Although the drafters, in the official comments and reporter's notes to sections
402 and 403, specifically referred to applications of the Revised Restatement's prin-
ciples to antitrust law, they also included a specific antitrust section-section 415.
Subsection (2) provides that U.S. antitrust laws may be applied extra-territorially "if
a principal purpose of the conduct or agreement [in restraint of trade] is to interfere
with the commerce of the United States, and the agreement or conduct has some
effect on that commerce."' 4 1 No separate reasonableness analysis is to be applied
here because "where restraint of United States trade is a principal purpose of an
agreement or conduct, United States jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law is clear
and clearly reasonable under § 403." 142 Otherwise, jurisdiction may be asserted
under subsection (3) "if such agreement or conduct has substantial effect on the
commerce of the United States and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable
under § 403(2) and (3)." 143 Here, the "principle of reasonableness" is to be applied
in the following manner:
The criteria set forth in § 403 and illustrated in this section are to be applied in light of the
purpose which the law in question is designed to achieve. For example, a principal
purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, is prevention of price fixing in
the United States market; protection of the United States market against price fixing,
therefore, is an interest entitled to great weight, even if the overt activity took place
outside of the United States by persons not nationals of the United States. In contrast,
section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, is designed to prevent concentration of
power in the United States, and the interest of the United States in preventing the merger
of two foreign firms, only because each of them is engaged in some line of commerce in
some section of the United States, would have much less weight. Similarly, participation
in a world-wide conspiracy to divide markets might engage U.S. interests more heavily
than would a failure to comply with pre-merger notification requirements under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 14 U.S.C. § 18a.' 44
140. Id. § 403(3). Specific applications of § 403(3) are found in § 419 dealing with the foreign government
compulsion defense and § 420(2) dealing with the enforcement of discovery orders in foreign countries or against foreign
nationals when compliance is prohibited by that foreign nation.
141. Id. § 415(2) (emphasis added).
142. Id. § 415 comment (a).
143. Id. § 415(3) (emphasis added).
144. Id. § 415 comment (c). The reporter's notes make specific reference to application of the principle of
reasonableness to the Westinghouse litigation:
In applying the principle of reasonableness, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in
the territory of another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive upon that state's sovereignty. See, e.g.,
the reaction of the House of Lords, and particularly the speech of Viscount Dilhorne, to participation by the
U.S. government in the effort by the Westinghouse Corporation to take the testimony of British witnesses to an
alleged conspiracy to fix the price of uranium. In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 8 1, esp.
at 107-108 (H.L.(E)). It is generally accepted by enforcement agencies of the United States government that
criminal jurisdiction over activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than
civil jurisdiction over the same or comparable activity, and only upon strong justification. No case is known of
criminal prosecution in the United States for an economic offense (not involving fraud) carried out by an alien
wholly outside the United States.
Id. § 403 reporter's note 7.
ANTITRUST EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY
The Revised Restatement thus contains yet another, different formulation of the
criteria to be considered when courts apply the "rule of reason." The Restatement
places significantly greater emphasis on international interests and norms than do the
Timberlane and Mannington Mills approaches.
Under the Revised Restatement approach, a court would first look to the in-
terests of the forum (referred to in the Revised Restatement as the "regulating")
state. 14 5 The Restatement proposes evaluating the forum nation's interest in the
specific activity in terms of the gravity of the offense under international norms.
146
This approach, in the abstract, is more meaningful; the customary evaluation of U.S.
interests when the U.S. is the forum nation simply paraphrases Topco and the refer-
ence therein to the Sherman Act as the economic version of our Bill of Rights. 147 This
latter "analysis" inevitably leads to findings that American interests are overriding.
Whether the courts will meaningfully apply the Revised Restatement's version of the
test, however, is far from clear.
The Revised Restatement also proposes that courts give separate attention to the
"expectations" of the defendant and the interests and norms of the international
community. 148 These criteria are relevant to the goal of developing extra-territoriality
rules that create a positive climate for international trade. Whether they can be
meaningfully applied by the court, however, is questionable.
The "expectations" factor 149 is grounded on the belief that "it would be unfair
and improper to hold a person liable under the local law of one state when he had
justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements of another state."150 A
multinational that engaged in conduct outlawed by U.S. antitrust laws will, however,
always argue "justifiable" reliance on the law of a "haven." How a court is to
evaluate such a claim and still give effect to U.S. antitrust laws is far from clear.
The courts also have little guidance available to them when evaluating the
importance of regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system.151
For example, antitrust economics has been a useful tool in the development of
domestic antitrust law. There is no comparable well-developed theory of the eco-
nomics of international competition law to which the courts can appeal for
guidance. 152
The Revised Restatement also requires a court to focus separately on the tradi-
tions of the international system. 153 The problem lies in identifying the sources that
145. Id. § 403(2)(a)-(c).
146. Id. § 403(2)(c).
147. See supra text accompanying note 61.
148. REvisED RESTATEmEwr, supra note 59, § 403(2)(d)-(e) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
149. Id. § 403(2)(d).
150. CONFLrcTS REsrAmre r, supra note 138, § 6 comment (g).
151. REVISED REsTArTMNT, supra note 59, § 403(2)(e) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). This factor is also derived from
the CONFLICrS REsTATEmtENr, supra note 138, § 6(a), which provides that courts consider "the needs of... the
international system." As explained in the Official Comments to this section, "'Probably the most important function of
choice-of-law rules is to make ... international systems work well. Choice-of-law rules, among other things, should
seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse between them." Id. comment
(d).
152. See generally Colloquiem on Competition and World Markets: Law and Economics, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW
& POL. 299-394 (1983).
153. REvtsED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 403(2)(f) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
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supply these traditions. International treaties and agreements are one source specific-
ally identified in the Timberlane and Mannington Mills decisions.1 54 Other sources
include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
which serves as a forum for the development of common substantive guidelines, and
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which has
been developing guiding Principles on Restrictive Business Practices. 155 Courts can
also review the various national competition laws, seeking common strands. The
problem with relying upon any of these sources is that different nations interpret even
identical substantive rules differently, their interpretations being dependent to a large
extent upon their political and economic philosophies. In addition, there may be
international norms not formally codified in any international agreement, nor sepa-
rately enacted by a majority of nation-states. Finally, and most significantly, the
history of litigation in this field dramatically demonstrates that there is no in-
ternational or even "Western" consensus regarding competition policy.
The Revised Restatement offers no radical modifications of existing procedures
that suggest how the interests of both the forum and affected nations should be made
known to the court. The only new proposal is that the court may take into account
statements made by representatives of the interested governments outside of the
court. 156 The Revised Restatement proposes that courts look to the Department of
Justice for expressions of domestic policy.
157
C. A Critique of Judicial Limiting Doctrines: The Laker Airways Litigation
The recent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 158 revealed the inability of judicial
limiting doctrines to resolve the extra-territoriality issue. Judge Wilkey demonstrated
in a scholarly opinion that no matter how formulated, judicial limiting doctrines can
never resolve the issue of extra-territoriality because that issue inherently involves
political considerations beyond the competence of courts.
The Laker Airways litigation "represents a head-on collision between the di-
ametrically opposed antitrust policies of the United States and United Kingdom, and
is perhaps the most pronounced example in recent years of the problems raised by the
concurrent jurisdiction held by several states over transactions substantially affecting
154. See supra text accompanying notes 115, 126.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 208-14.
156. REvtsED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 403 reporter's note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). "In making the
necessary determination, a court of the United States, for instance, may take into account expressions of interest by a
foreign state, whether made through a diplomatic note, a brief amicus curiae, or a declaration by government officials in
parliamentary debates, press conferences or communiques." Id.
157. Id.
Correspondingly, a court may take into account declarations of U.S. interest in official statements or records of
decisions by the Executive Branch. For instance, in a private antitrust suit, a court may give weight to a decision
by the U.S. Department of Justice that the interest of the United States in applying its antitrust law to a given
transaction or activity was not sufficiently strong to overcome the adverse effects on the foreign relations of the
United States.
Id. The REvISED REsTArEMENr reformulates the "principle of reasonableness" for purposes of discovery jurisdiction. Id.
§ 420(I)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). However, the test is fundamentally the same as that set out in § 403.
158. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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several states' interests."-1 59 Laker Airways, a British airline,6 filed a series of
private antitrust lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia against American, British, and European airlines. 6' Laker Airways alleged that
the Sherman Act was violated by a predatory pricing scheme organized by the
defendants in an attempt to eliminate low-priced Laker as a competitor in North
Atlantic scheduled air service. 162 The British defendants responded by obtaining an
antisuit injunction from the English courts prohibiting Laker from proceeding against
them in the U.S. 16 3 Under English law the alleged activities were not illegal.
16 4
The U.S. district court thereupon issued antisuit injunctions against the remain-
ing defendants, preventing them from obtaining similar relief from the English (or
159. Id. at 916.
160. Laker Airways was organized under the laws of the Isle of Jersey. Its principal place of business was in
London. Laker Airways was a wholly owned subsidiary of Laker Airways, Int'l, Ltd., an English company. See generally
H. BANKS, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREDDIE LAKER (1982).
161. Laker's first suit named Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. and McDonnell Finance Corp. (collectively McDonnell Douglas), British Caledonian Airways Ltd.,
British Airways Board (BA), Lufthansa, and Swiss Air Transport Co. as defendants. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am.
World Airways, No. 82-3362 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 24, 1982). Laker laterjoined KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and
Sabena Belgian World Airlines (Sabena) in a second suit, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, No.
83-0416 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 15, 1983), and Union de Transports Aeriens and SAS in a third suit, Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Union de Transports Aeriens, No. 83-2791 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1983).
162. Laker was forced into liquidation in England in early 1982. Defendants' prices for air services, fixed by the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), a trade organization of air carriers, were generally much higher than
those charged by Laker. Laker alleged that before it began flying, IATA announced a package of fares to compete with it
that were predatory. Laker further alleged that in 1981, when it had been weakened, inter alia, by defendants' predatory
activities, defendants:
conspired to set even lower predatory prices. In October 1981 Pan American Airlines, Trans World Airlines,
and British Airways dropped their fares for their full service flights to equal those charged by Laker for its
no-frills service. They also allegedly paid high secret commissions to travel agents to divert potential customers
from Laker. These activities further restricted Laker's income, exacerbating its perilous economic condition. At
IATA meetings in December 1981 at Geneva, Switzerland, and in January 1982 at Hollywood, Florida, the
IATA airlines allegedly laid plans to fix higher fares in the spring and summer of 1982 after Laker had been
driven out of business.
Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,917 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Laker also claimed that the airline
defendants, in furtherance of this scheme, interfered with Laker's attempt to reschedule its financial obligations. id. at
917. In late 1981 Laker had entered into two agreements to purchase new aircraft, one of which was with McDonnell
Douglas, financed in part by McDonnell Douglas' export finance subsidiary. By late 1981 Laker was unable to meet its
obligations. A rescue plan was agreed upon which provided that McDonnell Douglas would convert its loan into equity in
Laker. McDonnell Douglas withdrew from the plan in early 1982. Laker alleged that defendant airlines used their
influence as potential purchasers of aircraft to pressure McDonnell Douglas into withdrawing from the rescue plan. Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (D.D.C. 1983). The two-count complaint alleged (1)
violation of U.S. antitrust laws and (2) a common law intentional tort. Laker sought $350 million in compensatory
damages.
163. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 545. The two other European defendants
named in the original suit, Swissair and Lufthansa, also applied for relief but their applications were not ruled upon. The
English Secretary of State also issued an Order and Directives under the Trading Act of 1980, Protection of Trading
Interests (U.S. Antitrust Measures) Order 1983 (June 27, 1983), see supra note 13, aimed at frustrating the American
antitrust action. Indeed, the issuance of this Order and Directives was the "decisive factor" in the issuance of the antisuit
injunction by the English Court of Appeals. The decision of the English Court of Appeals was reversed by the House of
Lords in July 1984, in British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413.
164. England was a "haven" because "it is not unlawful (under English law) for a corporation to monopolize
commerce by offering exceptional terms resulting in losses so as to drive competitors out of business, with the expectation
that the losses will be recouped later once the competitor has been eliminated." Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1137 (D.D.C. 1983). While there was a cause of action in England for conspiracy, "the
crux of an unlawful conspiracy is an intent to injure the plaintiff, and ... an agreement or combination which has as its
purpose the protection of the interests of the defendants, whatever they may be, is not unlawful." Id.
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any other foreign) courts. 165 Two of the European defendants appealed, challenging
the validity of the U.S. antisuit injunction.
The affected nations' interests in the Laker litigation were substantial. Foreign
governments view their national carriers "not only as instruments of transportation,
but also as instruments of economic policy, domestic and foreign policy (and) nation-
al defense." 1 66 Thus, many foreign governments, including the relevant European
countries and the United Kingdom, have sought to protect their national airlines from
the vagaries of competition. This has resulted in the negotiation of restrictive bilateral
air transport agreements.
167
The circuit court concluded that the United Kingdom and the U.S. had
concurrent jurisdiction. The U.S. jurisdictional base was territorial: "[tihe pre-
scriptive application of United States antitrust law ... is founded upon the harmful
effects occurring within the territory of the United States as a direct result of the
alleged wrongdoing." 168 The British jurisdictional base was to some extent territo-
165. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983). The antisuit injunctions
were not issued against Lufthansa or Swissair, both of which had already filed actions in the English courts. See supra
note 163.
166. B. GiDwrrz, THE PoLMCs OF INTERPNATIOOAL AIR TRANSPORT 32 (1980).
As economic instruments, airlines are expected to contribute to the expansion of a country's industrial base, spur
the development of remote regions, earn foreign currency, and, in some countries, help to support an indigenous
aircraft industry. As political instruments, airlines are perceived by some as conferring prestige upon their
countries of registry and are used as tools of foreign policy implementation. Inauguration of air ser-
vice . . . may be viewed as a symbol of detente, desire for expansion of bilateral ties .... In nearly all
countries civil airliners are expected to be utilized for military airlift purposes in time of emergency.
Id.
167. Indeed, the conflict between the United States and the United Kingdom over the economic policy applicable to
international air transport dates back to an international conference called in 1944 to deal with this question. There,
American demands for free competition were met with equally strident demands by the English, supported by the other
European countries, for regulated competition. England succeeded in that dispute, defeating the call for a multilateral
aviation agreement based on free competition and negotiating a highly restrictive bilateral agreement with the United
States called Bermuda I, United States-United Kingdom Air Transport Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat.
1499-1516, T.I.A.S. No. 1507, and referred to by Europeans as "the Magna Carta of civil aviation." Sion, Multilateral
Air Transport Agreements Reconsidered: The Possibility of a Regional Agreement Among North Atlantic States, 22 VA. J.
INT'L L. 155, 163 n.43 (1981). Bermuda I represented a model for all other European bilateral aviation agreements. To
this day, the restrictive model is the basis for inter-European civil aviation. See generally id. at 155.
168. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Wilkey
conceded that "[although some of the alleged anticompetitive actions occurred within the United States, most of the
conspiratorial acts took place in other countries." Id. at 923-24 (footnotes omitted). However, this was of "no overriding
significance, since the economic consequences of the alleged actions gravely impair significant American interests." Id.
at 924. The significant interests of American consumers and American creditors superseded Laker's interests since it was
in liquidation. The following interests of American consumers were identified by Judge Wilkey:
For decades, a great percentage of passengers on North Atlantic air routes has been United States citizens. The
greatest impact of a predatory pricing conspiracy would be to raise fares for United States passengers. No other
single nation has nearly the same interest in consumer protection on the particular combination of routes
involved in Laker's antitrust claims.
Id. (footnotes omitted). As to the creditors:
Because Laker is currently being liquidated, the claims of its creditors are even more directly at stake than
consumer interests. Laker is now little more than a corporate conduit through which its assets, including any
damages owed Laker, will pass to its creditors. Its antitrust action is primarily an effort to satisfy its creditors,
who ultimately bear the brunt of the injury allegedly inflicted upon Laker. . . . Laker's principle creditors are
Americans. Laker's fleet of American manufactured DC-10 aircraft was largely financed by banks and other
lending institutions in the United States. Moreover, a substantial portion of its total debt obligations are likely to
have been American, since the bulk of the debts and expenses were payable in American dollars. The actions of
the alleged conspirators destroyed the ability of Laker to repay these American creditors; any antitrust recovery
will therefore benefit these United States interests.
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rial, 169 but was primarily based on the "British nationality of the parties in-
volved." 1 70 Thus, each had prescriptive jurisdiction to issue the antisuit injunctions.
The court then turned to the question relevant to our discussion: whether there
was "some satisfactory avenue, open to an American court, which would permit the
frictionless vindication of the interests of both Britain and the United States." 7' The
court held that there was not, because "[t]he conflict faced here is not caused by the
courts of the two countries. Rather, its sources are the fundamentally opposed nation-
al policies toward prohibition of anticompetitive business activity. These policies
originate in the legislative and executive decisions of the respective countries."
172
U.S. policy is procompetitive and aggressively extra-territorial, 173 while "the gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom is now and has historically been opposed to most
aspects of United States antitrust policy insofar as it affects business enterprises based
in the United Kingdom."
' 74
The court found the "rule of reason" useless in allocating jurisdiction when
jurisdiction is concurrent:
Many of the contacts to be balanced are already evaluated when assessing the existence of
a sufficient basis for exercising prescriptive jurisdiction. Other factors, such as "the
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity," and "the
likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states" are essentially neutral in deciding
between competing assertions of jurisdiction. Pursuing these inquiries only leads to the
obvious conclusion that jurisdiction could be exercised or that there is a conflict, but does
not suggest the best avenue of conflict resolution .... Those contacts which do purport to
provide a basis for distinguishing between competing bases of jurisdiction, and which are
thus crucial to the balancing process, generally incorporate purely political factors which
the court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly
balancing. 175
Thus, the proposed consideration of "the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation [of restrictive practices] is generally accepted" 176 is a political one:
Id. (footnotes omitted). The court identified other U.S. interests:
In addition to the protection of American consumers' and creditors' interests, the United States has a substantial
interest in regulating the conduct of business within the United States. The landing rights granted to appellants
are permits to do business in this country. Foreign airlines fly in the United States on the prerequisite of obeying
United States law.
Id. (footnotes omitted). "The United States has an interest in maintaining open forums for resolution of creditors'
claims." Id. at 925.
169. "A number of the purported conspiratorial acts took place in Great Britain land t]he conspiracy allegedly
caused bankruptcy of a corporation operating in Great Britain." Id. at 926.
170. Id. (emphasis in original).
171. Id. at 945.
172. Id.
173. The Court found the "effects" test articulated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), implicitly ratified by congressional inaction over the past 40 years. 731 F.2d 909, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
174. 731 F.2d 909, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court continued:
The British Government objects to the scope of the prescriptive jurisdiction invoked to apply the antitrust laws;
the substantive content of those laws, which is much more aggressive than British regulation of restrictive
practices; and the procedural vehicles used in the litigation of the antitrust laws, including private treble damage
actions, and the widespread use of pretrial discovery.
Id.
175. Id. at 948-49.
176. REvisrD REsTATErENTr, supra note 59, § 403(2)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (emphasis added).
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[A]lthough more and more states are following the United States in regulating restrictive
practices, and even exercising jurisdiction based on effects within territory, the differing
English and American assessment of the desirability of antitrust law is at the core of the
conflict. An English or American court cannot refuse to enforce a law its political
branches have already determined is desirable and necessary.
177
The existence of justified expectations 178 is also a political factor since it de-
pends on the desirability of applying U.S. antitrust law to a particular case. Similarly,
a third factor, "the importance of regulation to the regulating state," is a political
one:
17 9
We are in no position to adjudicate the relative importance of antitrust regulation or
nonregulation to the United States and the United Kingdom. It is the crucial importance of
these policies which has created the conflict. A proclamation by judicial fiat that one
interest is less "important" than the other will not erase a real conflict.'
80
The court further argued that the "rule of reason" was unlikely to achieve its
goal of promoting international comity.' 8 1 Courts applying that analysis have de-
ferred to foreign jurisdictions only when U.S. interests are de minimis: "[w]hen push
comes to shove, the domestic forum is rarely unseated."1 8 2 According to the court,
one reason for this lies in the nature of national courts:
Despite the real obligation of courts to apply international law and foster comity, domestic
courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals. Domestic courts are created by
national constitutions and statutes to enforce primarily national laws. The courts of most
developed countries follow international law only to the extent it is not overridden by
national law. Thus, courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing
foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over
foreign interests. 183
Another explanation is the "inherent noncorrelation between the interest balanc-
ing formula and the economic realities of modem commerce."' 184 Contrary to the
implicit assumption of the rule of reason that "there is a line of reasonableness which
separates jurisdiction to prescribe into neatly adjoining compartments of national
jurisdiction," there is "the reality of our interlocked international economic network
[which] guarantees that overlapping, concurrent jurisdiction will often be pre-
sent." 185
In spite of the serious practical difficulties that the court admittedly faced in
asserting jurisdiction, it declined to effect a political compromise and would not
177. 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).
178. REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 403(2)(d) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
179. Id. § 403(2)(c).
180. 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
181. Id. The court noted that "the usefulness and wisdom of interest balancing to assess the most 'reasonable'
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction has not been affirmatively demonstrated. This approach has not gained more than a
temporary foothold in domestic law. Courts are increasingly refusing to adopt the approach. Scholarly criticism has
intensified." Id. (footnotes omitted).
182. Id. at 951 (footnotes omitted).
183. Id. (footnotes omitted).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 952 (footnotes omitted).
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unilaterally abandon its jurisdiction, holding that to be beyond its authority and, in
light of the coercive nature of the English action, not likely to "materially advance
the principles of comity and international accommodation." 186 The U.S. court was in
direct conflict with a foreign court. It could not negotiate nor invoke diplomatic
channels. Faced with a choice of either asserting or forfeiting jurisdiction, it chose the
former.
D. Evaluation of Judicial Limiting Doctrines
The judiciary has developed U.S. policy on the extra-territorial application of
the Sherman Act. Not surprisingly, the courts emphasize U.S. competition policy and
are implicitly concerned with the development of havens from that policy. The courts
are not well-positioned to consider the impact of their decisions on the interests of
affected nations and on the efficiency of international trade. Further, whenever issues
concerning the interaction of national legal systems have arisen the U.S. courts have
often found themselves in an adversarial position. The limiting doctrines, developed
and developing, fail to satisfy the objectives set forth in part III of this Article for the
following reasons.
1. The Sovereignty-Related Defenses Are Often Dependent upon Form
Rather than Substance
Territoriality remains a cornerstone of these defenses. The commercial/
noncommercial distinction is also highly dependent upon form. The narrowing of the
defenses is probably a response to egregious behavior by some nations and multi-
national firms. This contraction services the objective of avoidance of havens but
does not adequately consider the other three objectives.
2. The Various Formulations of the "Jurisdictional Rule of Reason"
Require the Courts to Make Political Judgments
that are Beyond Their Competency
In assessing the interests of affected nations, courts must inherently make a
political judgment. The importance of particular policies to a foreign government is
highly dependent upon political factors. The balancing of the interests of affected
nations against those of the U.S. will often involve issues of foreign policy. None of
the accepted definitions of the judiciary's role contemplates that the courts should, or
are even competent to, make such judgments.
3. An Affected Nation Does not Have Effective Means by Which
to Make Known Its Interests to a U.S. Forum Court
As discussed above, 18 7 an affected nation acting by proxy through a party or a
U.S. government agency cannot effectively present its viewpoint. The interests of the
186. Id. at 954.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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parties to the suit will rarely coincide perfectly with those of the affected nation. The
message is diluted when it passes through an intermediary. Further, the court may
consider the interests only in reaching its all or nothing decision regarding jurisdic-
tion, so that assertion of jurisdiction completely defeats the interests of the foreign
nation.
4. The Limiting Doctrines Have Been Applied in an Arbitrary Fashion
Although creative scholars can find threads of doctrinal consistency among the
many decisions concerning extra-territorial application of U.S. competition law, the
most dominant factor may well be the relative power of the U.S. versus that of the
affected parties. Thus, the courts are quick to deny jurisdiction over OPEC, but more
sanguine about asserting jurisdiction over international airlines and natural resource
companies that are highly dependent upon the American market and which do not
have the power to impose dramatic economic sanctions in retaliation.
5. The Evaluation of an Affected Nation's Interests in Considering
Whether to Assert Jurisdiction Limits a Court in its
Ability to Consider the Full Range of Objectives
If the court considers the rule of reason criteria only in determining whether
jurisdiction exists, then it must decide on a one-shot basis which objectives predomi-
nate. There is an all or nothing dimension to the decision, and the court cannot
creatively balance objectives in formulating remedies or in interpreting competition
law.
6. Ultimately, the Limiting Doctrines Fail Because They Represent
a Unilateral Attempt to Deal with a Multilateral Problem.
This point will be elaborated upon in part V of this Article.
V. POLITICAL SOLUTIONS
The political branches have been less successful than the judiciary in developing
procedures to minimize conflicts arising from extra-territorial application of the U.S.
competition laws, even though legislation would appear to be the preferred solution
for such a multifarious and complex problem. No comprehensive legislation dealing
with the problem has been enacted, and the only legislative responses have been
slightly modified codifications of existing legal doctrines.' 88
A number of countries have negotiated bilateral intergovernmental notification
and consultation agreements, 189 but these agreements are ineffective because they are
nonbinding and are of particularly limited use when private parties invoke enforce-
ment proceedings. The ultimate solution probably lies in the adoption of international
188. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982); the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982).
189. See infra text accompanying notes 195-205.
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norms of economic regulation, but a pragmatic assessment must necessarily yield
little hope of achieving this goal in the foreseeable future. We address each of the
political approaches more fully below.
A. Legislation
The extra-territoriality problem appears to be more readily solvable through
legislation than through adjudication. By the nature of their role in the legal system,
courts can deal only on an ad hoc basis with the particular cases that happen to come
before them. Further, the courts must properly interpret and apply relevant legislation
and precedent, and therefore cannot step out of their role to create an entirely novel
approach designed to achieve the objectives listed in part III. Although congressional
hearings were held on the issue,190 effective legislation has not yet emerged. The
current proposals for legislation are directed primarily at limiting extra-territorial
private enforcement of the antitrust laws by imposing special restrictions and de-
veloping a statutory exemption for foreign cartels.
191
1. Imposing Special Restrictions on Extra-Territorial Litigation
Elimination of private suits as a solution to the problem of how to weigh the
interests of affected nations is superficially attractive, because public enforcers
through executive action should always be able to consider the foreign relations
aspects of prospective litigation. But any restriction on the right of private enforce-
ment is likely to produce a host of pragmatic problems and call into question fun-
damental U.S. legal policies. Private enforcement has been an increasingly important
component of the enforcement of American antitrust laws.' 92 If this were removed in
foreign litigation, a very heavy burden would be imposed upon public enforcers.
Without greatly increased budgets, a likely result would be greatly reduced enforce-
ment against foreign restraints or a forfeiture of the traditional public enforcer's role
complementing private domestic antitrust litigation. Substantial budgetary increases
for antitrust enforcement may not currently be politically feasible and will always be
a political issue. It is impractical to assume that increases would be immediately
forthcoming. Although greatly reduced antitrust enforcement in foreign commerce
might be a very satisfactory outcome from the perspective of prospective defendants,
it would leave the foreign commerce of the U.S. subject to inefficiencies resulting
from unchallenged trade restrictions.
Pragmatic problems are also involved in the imposition of special restrictions on
extra-territorial litigation. Many international business transactions do not separate
190. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 432, supra note 3.
191. Serious proposals include (1) limiting recovery to compensatory damages only, (2) applying a "'rule of reason"
analysis in foreign commerce cases even though per se rules would be applied domestically, (3) wholly eliminating private
suits in foreign commerce, and (4) establishing a system for the exemption of foreign cartels. A related, but more limited,
legislative proposal calls forJustice Department (or foreign government) amicus intervention inprivate suits to present the
views of the affected nations to the court. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 57. We believe our proposal is substantially
more effective than such proposals.
192. ABA Report, supra note 57, at 1-2.
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easily into domestic and foreign dimensions. As a consequence, it would be difficult
to structure efficient limitations on private enforcement. For example, should a pri-
vate litigant be restricted if a case were found to have a not insubstantial foreign
dimension? Should the foreign and domestic dimensions be segregated so that a
private suit and remedies would be limited to domestic impacts? Alternatively,
should distinctions focus on the nationality of the parties or the locus of the illegal
acts? Each of these approaches has significant shortcomings. Imposing a dichotomy
based on locus and nationality could encourage multinationals to conduct anticom-
petitive activities through intermediaries in foreign havens. On the other hand, sub-
jecting the "domestic" American portion of an international transaction to U.S.
antitrust laws would seriously handicap American-based firms in international trade.
Finally, fairness to antitrust victims is a dimension to be considered. Although
the private enforcement provisions of the antitrust laws are more concerned with
punishing violators than compensating victims, it would be inequitable to allow
victims of domestic violations to recover treble damages while victims of identical
acts undertaken in a foreign context are denied recovery altogether. If recovery is to
be denied, it should be on a case-by-case basis and only because a strong justification
exists in the context of the particular litigation to prefer the interests of one or more
affected nations. When so much is at stake and the cases are so complex, an arbitrary
restriction of recovery rights is bad policy.
2. Legislating a Statutory Exemption for Foreign Cartels
An intriguing current proposal calls for congressional delegation of authority to
the executive to grant antitrust exemptions to multiple-nation cartels on grounds of
comity or foreign relations.1 93 Under the proposal, government as well as private
cartelists (or prospective cartelists) could petition for antitrust immunity, even if no
suit has been brought against them. 19 4 This proposal would further the goal of
promoting international trade by allowing firms to plan business activities without
fear of the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.
Many problems remain to be resolved in the proposals advanced thus far. First, a
foreign government engaged in an important national activity (for example, regulat-
ing the extraction of a prime natural resource by encouraging private cartels or by
fixing prices) is likely to consider a requirement to apply for a discretionary statutory
exemption from U.S. law as a highly offensive invasion of its sovereignty. Second,
the proposals, which so far have been set forth in only general terms, do not preclude
domestic corporations from applying for this exemption, encouraging the search for
havens in which pliable foreign governments can sanction otherwise clearly anticom-
petitive activities. Last, and most important, is the pragmatic problem of how the
executive branch can evaluate prospectively the impact of the proposed anticompeti-
tive conduct on U.S. commerce.
193. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Flowe, A New Approach to U.S. Enforcement of Antitrust Laws Against Foreign
Cartels, 6 N.C.J. INr'L L. & COMM. REG. 81 (1980); Note, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to International
Cartels Involving Foreign Governments, 91 YALE L.J. 765, 788-91 (1982).
194. Note, supra note 193, at 789.
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B. Bilateral Notification and Consultation Procedures
A number of countries have developed procedures for intergovernmental
notification and consultation prior to the assertion of extra-territorial prescriptive
jurisdiction in cases involving national competition laws. 195 The U.S. has recently
negotiated two such accords, one with Australia' 96 and the other with Canada. 197
Under these accords either government, intending to take action involving national
economic policy that may affect the interests of the other nation, agrees to notify' 98
and if necessary consult with the other prior to taking that action. Each party then is
committed to consider the significant national interests of the other in an effort to
reduce conflicts. 199 As applicable to the U.S., this primarily affects decisions by the
Justice Department and the FTC concerning the initiation of antitrust or unfair trade
practice litigation.
The accords are likely to smooth relationships because they formally identify
issues most likely to trigger international confrontations. The United States-Australia
Accord, negotiated after the Westinghouse litigation, identifies the following as areas
of special concern to Australia: A U.S. investigation relating to the "exportation
from Australia of Australian natural resources or goods manufactured or produced in
Australia" that involves conduct (i) required by Australian law; (ii) by an "author-
ity" of the Australian government; (iii) when export to the U.S. is not contemplated;
or (iv) which consisted of representations to, or discussions with, the Australian
government. 200 Therefore, Australia is most concerned about the extra-territorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws to its prime natural resources or key domestic
industries when there is substantial government involvement and/or minimal and
unintended effects on U.S. commerce. The United States-Canada Accord is broader.
It refers to antitrust investigations by one party (a) of acts conducted "wholly or in
part" in the territory of the other; (b) of extra-territorial acts "required, encouraged
or approved by the other party;" or (c) more generally, which may reasonably be
expected to lead to an enforcement action "likely to affect a national interest of the
195. Such a process has been worked out by the countries of the European Economic Community. Baxter, supra
note 48, at 842.
196. Agreement Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, reprinted in
43 AmrrRtsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1071, at 36-37 (July 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Australia
Accord].
197. Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Applica-
tion of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, United States-Canada, reprinted in 46 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REo. REP.
(BNA) No. 1156, at 560 (Mar. 15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Canada Accord].
198. See, e.g., the U.S.-Canada Accord, supra note 197, para. 2(1): "The Parties will notify each other whenever
they become aware that their antitrust investigations or proceedings, or actions relating to antitrust investigations or
proceedings of the other Party, involve national interests of the other or require the seeking of information located in the
territory of the other." The U.S.-Australia Accord, supra note 196, is somewhat different. The U.S. agrees to notify the
Australian government of any governmental antitrust investigation "that may have implications for Australian laws,
policies or national interests," if possible, "prior to the convening of a grand jury or issuance of any civil investigative
demand, subpoena or other compulsory process." The government of Australia agrees to notify the U.S. of any policy
adopted "that it considers may have antitrust implications for the United States." Id. art. 1.
199. Under the U.S.-Australia Accord, supra note 196, art. 2, either side can request consultations with the other
after notification, and both parties "shall seek earnestly to avoid a possible conflict between their respective laws, policies
and national interests and for that purpose to give due regard to each other's sovereignty and to considerations of comity."
Id.; see U.S.-Canada Accord, supra note 197, para. 4.
200. U.S.-Australia Accord, supra note 196, art. 2(6)(b).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
other party. "201 The Accord also refers to requests for information in the territory of
the other party, 20 2 requiring, inter alia, consultations prior to the invocation of
defensive antidiscovery legislation.
213
The accords also address how the interests of the affected nation are to be
presented in private lawsuits. Both call for amicus intervention by the forum govern-
ment on behalf of the affected nation, the substance of that intervention to be based
upon the intergovernmental consultation. 204 This presupposes the completion of con-
sultations prior to the filing of the private suit, or at the very least, prior to the court's
ruling on the jurisdictional issue. This assumption is not necessarily valid in all
cases.
205
The fatal flaw with the use of bilateral accords, however, is that like the doctrine
of comity, these procedures do not result in a determination of which nation's in-
terests should prevail. 20 6 Moreover, accords are primarily relevant to governmentally
instituted enforcement proceedings. Thus, they are unlikely to be more effective in
avoiding international confrontations than the judicial limiting doctrines. Finally,
although they may provide a partial solution to conflicts arising from transactions
occurring between two nations, the accords will not effectively address cartels that
involve the interests of many nations.
C. International Conventions
The ultimate solution necessarily lies beyond unilateral or bilateral approaches
and will require extensive multilateral (for example, most Western nations) or univer-
sal international action. Any attempted resolution that falls short of binding "in-
ternational" legislation or its equivalent, built upon the yielding of national
sovereignty, will be self-limited and inherently unstable.
An international convention creating an international restrictive trade practices
law appears to be the solution favored by many commentators. 20 7 Through this
201. U.S.-Canada Accord, supra note 197, para. 2(2)(i)-(ii), (v).
202. Id. para. 2(2)(iii)-2(2)(iv).
203. Id. para. 5.
204. See U.S.-Australia Accord, supra note 196, art. 6; U.S.-Canada Accord, supra note 197, para. 11.
205. For example, in the Laker litigation the courts in both England and the U.S. had to render decisions on
applications for injunctive relief. The requests for injunctive relief raised issues of jurisdiction and comity and required a
ruling prior to the commencement of formal consultations between the two countries as requested by England under
Bermuda 2. Requests for injunctive relief, with claims of irreparable harm, simply cannot await formal intergovernmental
consultations. While a court could stay the proceedings for a period of time to allow for intergovernmental consultations,
it is not required to do so and it may not necessarily be prudent to do so. In this case "there was no time for this
process.... Either jurisdiction was protected or it was lost. It is unlikely that the employment of a hasty and poorly
informed balancing process would have materially aided the district court's evaluation of the exigencies and equities of
Laker's request for relief." Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
206. Thus, the U.S.-Australia Accord, supra note 196, provides that after consultations regarding proposed U.S.
antitrust investigations, if "no means for avoiding a conflict between the laws, policies or national interests of the two
parties has been developed, each party shall be free to protect its interests as it deems necessary." Id. art. 4(2); see
U.S.-Canada Accord, supra note 197, para. 7(3).
207. Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28 Irr'L & CoMp. L.Q. 575,
596-97 (1979); Taylor, The Extraterritoriality of the Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J. INr"L LAW & EcoN. 273, 308-09
(1979); Triggs, Extraterritorial Reach of United States Anti-Trust Legislation: The International Law Implications of the
Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producers' Cartel, 12 MELn. U.L. REv. 250, 282 (1979).
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convention nations could attack the problem directly by establishing a consensus
concerning the proper parameters of international competition law. Ratification by
most nations would be the equivalent of legislation by a world legislature. At the
same time that a substantive law is established, a mechanism for enforcement could
be created. Preferably, this would involve a specialized international court with
preemptive jurisdiction over any competition lawsuit involving extra-territorial di-
mensions.
Because such an international agreement would result in the uniform application
of a single body of competition law to all multinational transactions, it is not surpris-
ing that serious efforts to establish a convention have spanned three decades, running
from the Havana Charter for International Trade Organizations through the present
U.N.-based action under UNCTAD.2 °8
These efforts have so far resulted only in the 1980 adoption by the United
Nations General Assembly of a nonbinding resolution establishing guidelines for the
development and implementation of an international antitrust code (U.N.
Guidelines). 20 9 The U.N. Guidelines, modeled on the Sherman Act and the Treaty of
Rome, appear to establish international norms of economic behavior. 210 They con-
demn enterprises (including transnational corporations) that engage in horizontal
price-fixing, market or customer allocation, or collective refusals to deal. The Guide-
lines also condemn unilateral behavior that is predatory, discriminatory, or a means
of acquiring control. 2 1' The facade of compromise and agreement in the Guidelines
masked sharp differences between nations on fundamental principles. For example,
nations disagreed over the importance of competition vis-a-vis other national in-
terests. Developing states, especially those with economies dependent on a single
marketable resource, supported cartelization to control fluctuation in the price and
supply of their critical resources, in general opposition to the free trade and market
policies of the developed states.2 12 However, to the extent that developing nations
were the victims of restrictive business practices they advocated stronger controls on
multinational corporations.2 13 The Guidelines also specifically avoided the issue of
extra-territorial jurisdiction of national competition laws. 2 14
The establishment of international conventions, perhaps the only way to finally
resolve the extra-territoriality issue, is not likely in the foreseeable future. 2 15 The
208. See Triggs, supra note 207, at 250, 258.
209. The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices. G.A. Res. 35163, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 123, U.N. Doe. A/RFS/35/63 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
U.N. Guidelines). See generally Note, Antitrust Law: United Nations Guidelines, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 405 (1981).
210. Section B of the Guidelines is modeled on §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982), and art. 85
and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Section
B provides that an enterprise engages in restrictive business practices when, by abusing its powerful position in the
marketplace (compare § 2 of the Sherman Act and art. 86 of the Treaty of Rome) orby making various arrangements with
other enterprises (compare § I of the Sherman Act and art. 85 of the Treaty of Rome), it restrains competition in a way
that adversely affects international trade and the economic development of a developing state.
211. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 209, § D.
212. Note, supra note 209, at 409-10 n.30.
213. Id.
214. An issue specifically raised by Canada and the United Kingdom. Id. at 410-11.
215. A United Nations Conference is to be held in 1985 to review the entire code. Id. at 409.
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fundamental problem undermining international efforts lies in the vast differences
between the substantive law of the various Western nations. It will be a herculean
task to find a satisfactory middle ground; without some middle ground or consensus
few nations would ratify any binding convention. Countries with liberal or nonexist-
ent national competition laws would be reluctant to ratify an agreement that greatly
expanded the potential liability of their national firms. Countries like the U.S. with
more conservative trade practice laws would find themselves required to forfeit
components of their long-standing domestic laws. This would represent a radical
policy change and would constitute a formidable hurdle to ratification. Roberts and
Liebhaberg suggest additional reasons why U.S. ratification would be difficult to
achieve:
The United States, for example, has for technical reasons arising from its federal constitu-
tion only ratified seven conventions and almost certainly would not ratify a convention on
multinational companies, which would have to be enforced by the separate states who
would not be a party to the convention. Since the overwhelming majority of multi-
nationals are U.S. based this would seriously weaken the convention.
2 1
6
Somehow a formula must be found for successfully integrating the substantive
principles of an international convention on restrictive trade practices with domestic
antitrust laws. Until this is achieved no ultimate resolution of the issue is possible.
VI. AN INTERIM PROPOSAL
We have argued that satisfactory .resolution of the problems surrounding extra-
territorial application of national competition laws will not occur until universal rules
and norms of economic regulation, promulgated under the auspices of an in-
ternational body such as the United Nations, are incorporated into the national laws of
all member states.21 7 In addition, there must be some international tribunal that is
universally accepted as the final arbiter for the interpretation of these norms. An
environment in which grating unresolved differences exist concerning the extra-
territorial application of national competition laws may ultimately provide incentives
for significantly affected nations to work for an effective international convention. 218
Ironically, deferral to the interests of affected nations by the U.S. or other nations
with strong competition laws may remove pressure critical to the ultimate satisfactory
216. Roberts & Leibhaberg, International Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: Trade Union and Management
Concerns, 15 BTrr. J. OF IND. REL. 356, 369 (1977).
217. See supra text accompanying note 207.
218. Compare SEC Request for Comments on Waiver By Conduct, 16 SEc. REG. & L. RP. (BNA) 1305, 1314
(1984). In discussing the potential benefits of a proposal that the purchase or sale of securities in the U.S., whether
directly or indirectly, should serve as a "waiver by conduct" of any applicable foreign secrecy laws, the SEC noted the
following potential "diplomatic" benefit:
Some foreign governments have indicated that they view efforts to compel persons within their territory to
produce evidence as an infringement of their sovereignty; however, they recognize that there must be effective
means of dealing with the problems created by transnational securities transactions. Repeated denials of U.S.
requests that evidence be provided on a voluntary basis would make clear to foreign governments that there is a
substantial need for negotiations to provide an effective means of obtaining the evidence needed to enforce the
U.S. securities laws and deter the misuse of secrecy laws, in order to avoid U.S. reliance upon court orders
compelling the production of evidence.
Id. at n.43 (emphasis added).
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resolution of the problem. 219 Unilateral compromise of U.S. competition policy in
international markets through an expanded "rule of reason" approach will si-
multaneously expand havens and reduce the chances for the creation of international
competition policy.
The U.S. has often been portrayed by affected nations as an "outlaw," creating
whatever problem that exists by its rude insistence on extra-territorial application for
its competition laws. 220 This characterization is inappropriate if the application of
competition laws to international transactions serves broader interests. We have
argued that a need exists for the prohibition of hard core anticompetitive activity that
may have major impacts upon national economies. 221 For example, nations have a
right to protect themselves from cartel behavior. We have further argued that creation
of havens for anticompetitive activity ill-serves the world economy.2 22 The economic
impact of monopolistic and cartel behavior is the same whether the actions occur
within or across borders; the same deadweight losses may accrue. Until international
agreements establish the proper parameters for world competition law, the U.S.
should continue to assert the international applicability of its competition laws, sub-
ject only to sovereignty-related limiting principles and the dictates of prudence.
The question then becomes how a principle of prudence can effectively be
grafted into U.S. law. The problem is exacerbated because the judiciary currently has
sole responsibility for implementing any considerations of prudence. As argued
above,223 the federal courts are ill-equipped for such a task without effective guid-
ance from the political branches.
As an interim and admittedly partial solution, we propose the following: First,
that the courts apply a jurisdictional test within their competence-an "intended
effects" test limited only by narrowly construed sovereignty-related defenses.
Second, that the "rule of reason" analysis be recharacterized into a prudence-based
analysis to be invoked only in relatively rare circumstances identified by the political
branches. We therefore propose legislation calling for Presidential invocation224 of
219. Bargaining theory recognizes what is labeled as a coercive aspect, involving the use of power of some kind to
intimidate, persuade, influence, or force a party to do something it ordinarily would not choose to do. P. DISsING & G.H.
SNYDER, CONFLicr AstoNr NATIONS 22 & n.14, 23 (1977). For a description of underlying conditions and elements
significant to international bargaining processes, see id. at 195-97, 476-77 & n.5.
220. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 432, supra note 3, at 60 ("the British Government has referred to the triple damage
action as the 'rogue elephant' of American law").
221. See supra note 38.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31, 175-80.
224. A similar proposal was made, in passing, by Lloyd Cutler. See Hearings on S. 432, supra note 3, at 62:
I thought it might be possible to have a statute in which, at least in suits against foreign defendants, the Attorney
General would be free to come in on behalf of the U.S. Government, after proper co-ordination within the
executive branch, to request of the court that the suit be dismissed for foreign policy or conflict of law reasons;
and that if the Attorney General so requested, the judge would be required to dismiss the private treble-damage
action.
Our proposal is more detailed than that of Mr. Cutler and differs from his proposal in at least four respects: (1) as in
Hickenlooper, see infra note 227, we support assertion of jurisdiction in all but the very exceptional case, as we believe
that this approach provides the best incentive for the negotiation of international norms; (2) we reformulated the "rule of
reason" in an effort to distill the truly relevant criteria, see infra part VI. A.; (3) we do not propose automatic dismissal,
for the reasons set forth in the text infra; and (4) our proposal focuses on the transaction as well as the defendant.
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the "principle of prudence" analysis in a Hickenlooper-type of Amendment to the
Clayton Act. Additionally, to promote our second parameter-fostering a positive
climate for international trade 225 -we endorse calls for legislation creating a new
antitrust exemption to the Sherman Act to be applied in favor of international cartels
by the executive branches of government.
226
A. Proposed Amendment
The Hickenlooper Amendment barred the courts from applying the act of state
defense in certain foreign expropriation cases unless, inter alia, the President in-
formed the court that consideration of the defense was essential for foreign policy
reasons.22 7 We propose congressional enactment of similar legislation regarding the
"rule of reason" analysis. Specifically, we call for the enactment of the following
amendment to section 4 of the Clayton Act:
No United States federal court shall decline on grounds of comity, or a ju-
risdictional rule of reason, to make a determination on the merits of a private treble
damage suit unless the President, in a suit against a foreign defendant and involving
a foreign transaction wherein prescriptive jurisdiction has been challenged by such a
defendant, determines that jurisdiction against the defendant(s) ought not to be
asserted because of the foreign policy interests of the United States.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
226. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
227. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982),
represented Congress' response to the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), in which the Court held that the courts of the U.S. were prevented by the act of state doctrine from examining the
validity of expropriations by the revolutionary Cuban government. The Hickenlooper Amendment provided in relevant
part that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international
law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party ... based upon . . . a
confiscation ... by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law .... Provided, That
this subparagraph shall not be applicable ... (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that
application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). The statute only applies to a very narrow category of cases. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970) (It applies only when a party who suffers an
expropriation in violation of international law brings suit to assert his claim to the expropriated property if there is an
attempt to market it in the U.S.). On its face the statute appears to provide that if the President determines that the act of
state doctrine should be applied in a particular case for foreign policy considerations and so notifies the court, the court
may then, and only then, independently consider the application of that doctrine, perhaps in light of the input provided by
the President. But this portion of the statute has been construed much more broadly by the REVISED REsrATrstrr, supra
note 59, § 429. The Official Comments indicate this:
When the amendment applies, absence of a communication from the Executive Branch requires the court to
conclude that adjudication of the claim would not interfere with the foreign policy interests of the United States.
If the President in a particular case determines that the foreign policy interests of the United States require
application of the act of state doctrine, a communication to that effect is binding on the court.
Id. at comment (f) (emphasis added). The reporter's notes similarly explain that the Amendment reflects congressional
recognition of "the possibility that adjudication of a claim challenging the act of a foreign state might be contrary to the
foreign policy interests of the United States; accordingly the Amendment provides that the President may preclude
adjudication of a particular claim by making a determination to that effect and notifying the court." Id. reporter's note 1.
Both constructions are supported by the Amendment's legislative history. See Hearings Before tie Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, on Draft Bill to Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, and
for Other Purposes, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Hickenlooper].
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The President shall invoke this provision by filing with the court, at any time
prior to the entry of judgment, a statement that the President has weighed the public
interest of the United States government against the private interest of the litigants
and determined that jurisdiction ought not to be asserted because of the foreign
policy interests of the United States. The President shall identify the relevant de-
fendant(s) and transaction(s). The President's statement shall be accompanied by an
analysis of the following factors: (1) the significant economic or national interests of
the affected foreign nations including (a) an analysis of the marketing policies of the
affected nations, (b) the extent to which the suit arises from (i) the regulation of a
prime natural resource or a primary industry of any affected nation and (ii) activities
which were required, encouraged or approved by any affected nations, and (c) the
extent and manner in which the President believes continuation of the antitrust
lawsuit and any potential judgment therefrom may adversely affect the significant
economic or other national interests of any affected nation; (2) the countervailing
significant economic or other national interests of the United States; (3) the contents
of any consultations conducted pursuant to a Notification and Consultation Accord;
(4) the possible effects upon United States foreign relations if the court exercises
jurisdiction and grants relief; and (5) whether a treaty with any affected nation has
addressed the issue.
Receipt of a statement of invocation from the President by a court creates a
rebuttable presumption as to the named defendant that the proceeding or the rele-
vant portions thereof should be dismissed.
For purposes of the Amendment: (1) a "foreign defendant" is a person char-
tered in, or a citizen of, a foreign nation and not majority owned by United States
citizens, corporations, or other persons; 228 (2) a "foreign transaction" is any com-
mercial transaction or series of related transactions having significant components
occurring outside of the United States.
B. Application of the Amendment
Under the proposed legislation courts would apply an "intended effects" test
modified only by the sovereignty-related defenses. We have noted three outstanding
issues with respect to the act of state doctrine: whether or not to (1) retain its rigid
territorial limitation; (2) incorporate a "commercial activities" exception; and (3)
limit its coverage so that it would not foreclose review of the motivation for the
foreign act. 229 An affirmative answer to all three issues (1) narrows the availability of
the defense, (2) furthers U.S. competition policy, (3) does not violate positive in-
ternational law, and (4) provides incentives for an international resolution of the
problem. We therefore advocate such a construction of the defense.
The proposed amendment modifies the current law on the "rule of reason"
analysis in a number of ways. On the one hand, courts can no longer apply the "rule
of reason" analysis unless it is invoked by the President. On the other hand, once
invoked the rule of reason analysis must be considered by the courts, even those in
228. Alternatively, a "foreign defendant" could be defined in a manner similar to the definition of "foreign
person" for purposes of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. See 16 C.F.R. § 801. I(e)(2)(i) (1984):
(2)(i) Foreign person. The term "foreign person" means a person the ultimate parent entity of which-
(A) Is not incorporated in the United States, is not organized under the laws of the United States and does
not have its principal offices within the United States; or
(B) If a natural person, neither is a citizen of the United States nor resides in the United States,
We prefer our version because it is narrower.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
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circuits that have previously declined to adopt it. 230 Courts have rejected the "rule of
reason" primarily because it entails an unstructured political analysis beyond their
competency. 231 Our proposal specifically addresses this issue, and requires the Presi-
dent to provide the courts with political background data and an initial weighing of
that data.
The President may not resort to the amendment's procedures for the benefit of a
particular defendant unless the defendant (a) affirmatively objects to (b) the assertion
of extra-territorial prescriptive jurisdiction. The amendment limits its applicability to
extra-territorial assertions of jurisdiction with the dual requirements that a lawsuit be
against a foreign defendant and involve a foreign transaction. What qualifies as a
"foreign transaction" should turn on an analysis of the entire transaction rather than
on discrete incidents such as where individual meetings of conspirators took place. 232
The proposed amendment also requires that the defendant affirmatively object by
answer, motion, or other appropriate procedural vehicle to the extra-territorial asser-
tion of prescriptive jurisdiction by the court in which the case is proceeding. The
requirement that the defendant object to the assertion of jurisdiction is included to
insure that Presidential intervention is limited to only those cases in which a good
faith basis exists for challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the forum court.
The President can invoke the proposed amendment's procedures up to the time
that judgment is entered by the trial court. This would allow the President the
flexibility of delaying the filing until consultations with the affected nations are
exhausted (which might affect the substance of the submission) and/or the trial court
has ruled on the applicability of any of the sovereignty-related defenses that might
render the President's actions moot. Alternatively, the President may decide to file at
the outset of the lawsuit in order to avoid a diplomatic confrontation. The OPEC
233
case, which was dismissed on sovereignty-related grounds, is illustrative. In that case
the President might have opted to await the court's decision on the sovereignty-
related defenses, and no executive action ultimately would have been taken. On the
other hand, if retaliatory actions were threatened, the President could have invoked
the amendment's procedures immediately.
The President is required to state to the court that the competing interests were
weighed and a determination made that jurisdiction should not be asserted against a
named defendant because of the foreign policy interests of the U.S. 234 The President
is also required to provide the court with the relevant underlying data235 upon which
230. E.g., the Seventh Circuit in In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.Zd 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); the D.C. Circuit in
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
231. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 175; see also Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am. on remand to the
district court, 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("[Allthough the judiciary is the most ill-equipped branch of the
U.S. government to do so, we are charged to make a limited inquiry into the effect of the defendants' and plaintiffs'
actions upon U.S. foreign policy.").
232. Thus, a meeting of Japanese automakers in Japan to fix the prices of cars they made in the U.S. to be sold in the
U.S. would not qualify as a foreign transaction. On the other hand, a meeting by Japanese automakers allocating the
output of cars made in Japan in an attempt to comply with U.S. import quotas would qualify as a "foreign transaction."
See, e.g., DeKieffer, Antitrust and the Japanese Auto Quotas, 50 ANTrrrMusTr L.J. 779 (1981).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
234. Thus complying with the requirements of Yakus v. United Staies, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
235. As identified by the parties to the Notification and Consultation Accords, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 200-03.
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the decision was made. Action by the President will establish a rebuttable presump-
tion that jurisdiction is not to be asserted over the named defendant(s). For several
reasons, presidential power to invoke a rebuttable presumption is preferable to a grant
of authority to require an outright dismissal. First, it allows the court to distinguish
between those cases in which the executive branch is concerned with foreign policy
considerations and those in which the executive branch simply objects to the underly-
ing theory of the case. Second, it allows the court to consider (or reconsider) the
sovereignty-related defenses and if appropriate, to dismiss on those grounds rather
than on the basis of presidential fiat. Third, it allows the plaintiffs to supplement in
court the underlying data provided by the President with material obtained, for
example, during discovery, and to demonstrate profound effects on U.S. commerce
not brought to the President's attention. The President's submission is likely to issue
at the request of the affected nation(s) and/or the defendant(s), and the President, in
making the decision, may be less likely to receive direct input from the plaintiffs.
Last, the President could necessarily make only an all or nothing choice concerning
whether the case should continue against a certain defendant. The courts have greater
flexibility and could, for example, determine that they could effectively address the
interests of the affected nations when determining remedies.
One last caveat remains. When the President invokes the amendment's pro-
cedures, the rebuttable presumption applies only to the named defendant(s) and then
only to the specified transaction(s). By the very language of the amendment, the court
is barred from applying the rule of reason analysis to any defendant or any transaction
not named by the President.
The proposal is drafted to maximize the objectives set forth in part III. The first
goal, avoidance of havens, 236 is furthered primarily by the threshold reliance on
judicial principles that give the antitrust laws their fullest legitimate jurisdictional
reach. It signals the fundamental premise that, absent compelling circumstances,
those who engage in activity with substantial and foreseeable anticompetitive effects
on U.S. commerce will be subject to the U.S. antitrust laws. The proposal would
contribute to our second parameter-a positive climate for international trade-in at
least one important dimension. It should greatly increase planning efficiency in that
firms could generally anticipate the extra-territorial application of U.S. laws. Invoca-
tion of the reasonableness criterion by the executive branch and the judicial reaction
thereto would establish a line of precedent that would guide the planning of affected
multinationals. Achievement of the second parameter is obviously more fully realized
by adoption of proposals for prospective antitrust exemptions. Although such pro-
posals are beyond the scope of this Article, we endorse them in principle. 237
The proposal is obviously tailored to meet the third parameter. In private actions
the affected nations' interests are meaningfully evaluated and balanced with U.S.
policies,2 38 and especially with the implications for U.S. foreign relations. The initial
236. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
237. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 47-61.
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evaluation is conducted by the branch of government charged with the obligation of
formulating and directing our foreign policy and possessed of the requisite
expertise-the executive branch. Affected nations can express their interests directly
to the executive branch via diplomatic channels and/or pursuant to Negotiation and
Consultation Accords. The affected nations will thus be communicating directly to
the branch of government considering their claims and can do so regardless of the
interests of the particular defendants in the lawsuit. This is clearly preferable to the
more indirect amicus intervention or reliance upon the private defendants when the
forum for the consideration of the affected nation's interests was the judiciary. The
specification of the factors to be evaluated by the executive branch should insure that
intervention will occur only in appropriate circumstances. The executive branch must
make its case within the parameters established by the statute; it cannot make a
decision on unexplained political factors and expect judicial compliance. The pro-
cedures established by the proposed statute should result in the development of a
formalized procedure by which affected nations are allowed to make their case as
forcefully as they can-with the caveat, however, that their case will be disclosed
publicly if the Executive Branch decides to invoke its authority under the statute.
Finally, the requirement that the President must consider the marketing philosophy of
the affected nation when conducting an evaluation is an effort to incorporate the
variance in the scope of applied national laws.
One of the barriers to the fourth parameter of promoting the "efficient interac-
tion of national legal systems ' 239 is the problem (raised in Laker) of "concurrent
jurisdiction.- 24 ° The foreign compulsion defense, with its rigid territorial limitation
and its requirement that there be coercive governmental action, does not adequately
respond to the problem. 24 1 Under our proposal, the President may inform the court
that despite the nonavailability of this defense the interests of the affected nation are
so great that their assertion of jurisdiction is more reasonable than U.S. assertions of
jurisdiction. It was precisely this type of guidance that Judge Wilkey sought in
Laker.
242
C. Constitutionality of the Amendment
Precluding the courts from applying a rule of reason or similar analysis unless
invoked by the President raises two significant constitutional issues: (1) whether the
President would circumscribe the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in violation of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) whether the President's action would
constitute a taking of property in violation of the fifth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
240. See supra text accompanying note 159.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 103, and 105-06.
242. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Such guidance
was subsequently provided when President Reagan, for "foreign policy reasons," ordered the Justice Department to
abandon its probe of Laker. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
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We look first at the constitutionality of that portion of the proposal directed at
limiting judicial invocation of a comity-based doctrine as the grounds for declining to
reach the merits of a lawsuit. This was one aspect of the Hickenlooper Amendment
that withstood a due process and separation of powers challenge in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr.243 Banco Nacional de Cuba was the continuation of the Sabbatino
case, the driving force behind the Hickenlooper Amendment. In Sabbatino, 244 a case
involving Cuban expropriation of American property, the Supreme Court mandated
application of the act of state defense and remanded. Congress then enacted the
Hickenlooper Amendment that barred application of the act of state defense in such
cases unless invoked by the President. The President failed to exercise his rights
under the Amendment, and the district court on remand issued summary judgment for
the U.S. defendant. On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the Cuban appellant's
constitutional challenges. First, the court held that no violation of the due process
clause occurred because the act of state defense was not a constitutionally protected
property right. The doctrine is based on a judicial policy of abstention unrelated to the
merits of the case. A legislative limitation on the availability of that defense is
analogous to the modification of statutes of limitation, which "does not create
or destroy constitutionally protected property rights in those affected by the
changes."
245
The Second Circuit also rejected the contention that "the Amendment is a
legislative interference with the judicial power and therefore violative of the con-
stitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.' 246 While the act of state defense had
"constitutional underpinnings," it was not constitutionally compelled,247 so that:
[T]he political branches of our national government should be able to modify the Court's
decision, choosing another constitutionally permissible alternative [rule of decision], es-
pecially as the factor upon which the choice is based, the effect on our foreign relations, is
admittedly more within the competence of the political branches of the Goverment than
the competence of the Court.2 48
The court's reasoning applies with even greater force here when we deal with a
comity doctrine that implicates the same foreign relations issues but does not have
243. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
244. 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see also supra notes 77, 227.
245. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
246. Id. at 180.
247. While the Supreme Court held in Sabbatino that the act of state doctrine "arises from our governmental system
of separation of powers" it did not therefore rule that application of the doctrine was constitutionally compelled or that the
case presented a non-justiciable "political question":
To the contrary, the approach was motivated by a recognition that the issues arising from a nation's expropria-
tion of the property of aliens are sensitive ones which the courts in some cases should be able to avoid by
application of the act of state doctrine in order not to embarrass the conduct of our foreign relations. Thus a total
prohibition upon the courts, declaring that they might never resort to the act of state doctrine, might well be
unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine. But we need not decide this; such a statutory
prohibition upon court action is not before us.
Id. at 181. Similarly, we have not proposed "a total prohibition upon the courts."
248. Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that "the Supremacy Clause may require a judicial surrender to the will
of Congress in situations which present no constitutional impediment to judicial surrender." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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"constitutional underpinnings," so that congressional legislation limiting its use is
less likely to tamper with the constitutional allocation of power.
The second and more difficult question is the constitutionality of a congressional
grant of power to the executive to create a presumption against the judicial assertion
of jurisdiction.
As yet no President has exercised similar rights under the Hickenlooper
Amendment2 49 and the constitutionality of such action has therefore never been
tested. Yet precedent suggests that this and similar legislation may withstand due
process and separation of power challenges.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan2 50 the Supreme Court upheld the President's
authority to suspend claims against Iran pending in American courts despite the
absence of specific authorization from Congress. 5 1 The Supreme Court specifically
rejected the separation of power challenge, holding that:
[W]e do not believe that the President has attempted to divest the federal courts of
jurisdiction. [The relevant] Executive Order ... purports only to "suspend" the claims,
not divest the federal court of jurisdiction .... This case, in short, illustrates the differ-
ence between modifying federal-court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a
different rule of law. The President has exercised the power, acquiesced in by Congress,
to settle claims and, as such, has simply effected a change in the substantive law govern-
ing the lawsuit.2
5 2
The Hickenlooper Amendment also was not a "modification of federal court
jurisdiction" but rather merely a change in the substantive law. As stated in testi-
mony at the hearings on the Second Hickenlooper Amendment:
The amendment does not in any way change the existing jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
Under the amendment they will continue to decide only cases and controversies before
them. They will continue, as they have in the past, to apply international law as part of the
law of the land. The function of the amendment is to see that they can continue to do these
things and to give justice to the parties before them except in these special cases where
they are requested for foreign policy reasons to suspend proceedings. 253
Our proposal is modeled on Hickenlooper, and we believe it similarly does not "in
any way, change the jurisdiction of U.S. courts."
The same issues were raised in Security Pacific National Bank v. Government
and State of Iran,2 54 a second case involving the President's suspension of claims
against Iran. On the separation of powers issue, the court declined to rule on "the still
unresolved issue of whether Congress may legislatively withdraw the jurisdiction of
the inferior federal courts over a pending case" since here "the President has not
249. RvisD RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 429 reporter's note 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983).
250. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
251. The Court found past Congressional acquiescence to such exercises of presidential power. Id. at 678-79.
252. Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
253. Hearings on Hickenlooper, supra note 227, at 592 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court declined to rule on
the fifth amendment issue, finding it not ripe for adjudication. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 452 U.S. 654, 688-89 (1981).
Justice Powell, concurring and dissenting in part, implied that there would be a fifth amendment problem to such
suspension of claims. Id. at 691.
254. 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
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withdrawn the jurisdiction of the courts" but rather has simply exercised the power to
settle claims against a foreign government." On the due process claim plaintiffs
relied upon the court's language in Gray v. United States256 that although the Presi-
dent had the power to settle claims, "[n]evertheless, the citizen whose property is
thus sacrificed for the safety and welfare of his country has his claim against that
country; he has a right to compensation, which exists even if no remedy in the courts
or elsewhere be given him." 2 57 In Security Pacific the court held that this passage
was dicta, and in light of subsequent decisions probably was not an accurate reflec-
tion of current law. 58 No case has been found adjudicating the right to such com-
pensation.25
9
These two cases obviously are of limited precedential value. 260 The conflicts
arising from the extra-territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, while serious, are
not as compelling as the Iranian hostage crisis. On the other hand, we do not propose
a suspension of claims but rather only the creation of a rebuttable presumption
against the assertion of jurisdiction. We also propose an express delegation of author-
ity by Congress to the President. Accordingly, we do not believe that there are
constitutional impediments to our proposal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The extra-territorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws, as articulated in the
Alcoa "effects test," has been a source of conflict with even our closest trading
partners. They object to the extra-territorial application of U.S. economic regulatory
laws in general and to the content of the U.S. antitrust laws in particular.
The formulation of proper boundaries for the extra-territorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws must be based upon the following four objectives: (1) insuring against
gaps in the international order so that firms cannot position themselves in "havens"
255. Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
256. 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886).
257. Id. at 392-93.
258. 513 F. Supp. 864, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
259. 1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 213 reporter's note (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
260. The utility of Dames & Moore as precedent was argued by the majority and dissent in Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Starr, dissenting, argued that "principles of
comity among the courts of the international community counsel strongly against the injunction in the form issued here"
because, inter alia, "while the facts of the case are indeed distinguishable, the spirit of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Dames & Moore v. Regan ... suggests strongly that a sovereign government can prohibit one of its nationals from
proceeding in a particular forum." Id. at 957 (Starr, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Judge Starr noted that "the British
Executive appears to be proceeding not from the compelling circumstances of a hostage crisis but from its antipathy
toward United States antitrust laws. But it is, in my judgment, not for me to say whether the British Executive's attitude in
this respect is reasonable or unreasonable." Id. Judge Wilkey, on behalf of the majority, responded to the dissent's
reliance on Dames & Moore, "which suggests that a national government may prohibit its nationals from suing in national
or other forums," id. at 943 (emphasis added) by raising a number of arguments that are relevant to our analysis. First,
Judge Wilkey argued that "in Dames & Moore the action taken by our government preserved the United States claims and
established a remedy for enforcing them" while the British action cancelled the claims and did not permit recovery of even
single damages. Id. Second, he argued that "this is not a suit against a government, but a private action against a private
corporation on a claim based on monopolistic practices." Id. Last, he noted that the American executive took an
affirmative position in Dames & Moore, whereas in Laker "it is the inaction and silence of the Executive Branch which is
said to shut off the availability of the United States forum'"--failure of the Department of Justice to file suit or otherwise
intervene--and the court found this inaction ambiguous at best. Id. at 944.
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and thus avoid the application of reasonable national competition laws; (2) providing
an equitable and efficient climate for the transaction of international business; (3)
adequately considering and balancing the political and economic interests of both
forum and affected nations; and (4) balancing or integrating the differences in pro-
cedural and substantive law among the forum and affected nations.
American judicial attempts to articulate proper boundaries for the extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws have failed to satisfy these four
objectives. The "sovereignty-related" defenses-the doctrines of foreign sovereign
immunity, act of state, and foreign sovereign compulsion-are not geared towards
evaluating the interests of the affected nations. Rather, they grant a per se immunity
to a foreign sovereign or its coerced agent when acting in the manner specified by
these defenses. This approach is at the same time too narrow and too broad. It is too
narrow because cases often arise in which the foreign sovereign has significant
national interests. Nevertheless, the defendant is not immune if the transaction in-
volves "commercial activity," albeit activity intimately linked with significant sov-
ereign interests, or if the transaction is as a matter of convenience or necessity
structured so that it does not fall within the rigid requirements of these defenses. It is
overly broad because activity may be encompassed therein that does not implicate
significant foreign interests. The jurisdictional "rule of reason" ostensibly requires
the courts to be sensitive to the interests of the affected nation, but this analysis is in
reality of little utility since it requires courts to make speculative judgments signifi-
cantly based upon political factors.
The solution to the extra-territoriality issue, in the short and long term, is not a
judicial but a political one. The long term solution is the promulgation and enforce-
ment of an international competition law code by an authoritative international body.
This solution is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future, and we therefore propose
the following interim solution. First, we advocate a narrow interpretation of all the
judicial doctrines limiting extra-territorial applications in order to generate friction
conducive to multilateral resolution of the problem in the long term. Second, to
identify those very few circumstances when extra-territorial jurisdiction must not,
even in the short term, be asserted because of current overriding national interests, we
propose the legislative creation of a mechanism very similar to that established by
Congress in the Hickenlooper Amendments. The President, not the courts, would
identify those cases in which overridingforeign policy considerations militate against
the assertion of jurisdiction, since this is essentially a political, not a judicial, deci-
sion. Presidential action would result in a rebuttable presumption against the assertion
of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
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